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INTRODUCTION 
In 1999, Palm Beach County commissioners authorized an 
eminent domain action against John and Wendy Zamecnik,1 tak-
ing the home that they had “fall[en] in love with” and “never 
wanted to leave” after twenty years of ownership2 in return for 
its fair market value3—the amount someone less connected to 
the home would have been willing to pay. The purpose of the 
eminent domain action was to build a golf course in a county 
that “ha[d] more golf courses per capita than any county east of 
the Mississippi River.”4 The low value of an additional golf 
course is reflected in the subsequent events: the land sat vacant 
as the county failed to follow through on the plan for a golf 
 
 † BA 2007, Swarthmore College; MA 2015, The University of Chicago; PhD Candi-
date 2018, The University of Chicago; JD Candidate 2018, The University of Chicago Law 
School. The author would like to thank Professors Nicole Stelle Garnett and Jonathan 
Masur as well as Eamonn Hart, Matthew Kugler, Tara Levens, Michael O’Brien, Omer 
Pelled, Krista Perry, André Pulcherio, Amy Upshaw, and Patrick Ward for their ex-
tremely helpful comments. 
 1 Thomas R. Collins, Evicted Homeowners Feel Betrayed over Failed Project, Palm 
Beach Post 1A (Mar 15, 2005). 
 2 Stephen Deere and Andy Reid, College Pitches Hillcrest Plan: Apprehensive Resi-
dents Want to See Details (S Fla Sun-Sentinel, Sept 19, 2005), archived at 
http://perma.cc/AD5T-QYU5. 
 3 The jury was instructed to consider the fair market value of the property. Jury 
Instructions, Palm Beach County v Craigmiles, Civil Action No 99-3196, *7–8 (Fla Cir 
filed Jan 25, 2002) (available on Westlaw at 2002 WL 34675392) (“The constitutional re-
quirement of full compensation means that the landowner must be paid completely for 
the whole loss resulting from the taking. In most cases, it will be necessary and suffi-
cient to full compensation that the award constitute the fair market value of the proper-
ty.”). The Zamecniks were also given a small allocation for moving expenses of $4,000. 
See generally Verdict for Parcel Nos. 283 & 329, Palm Beach County v Craigmiles, Civil 
Action No 99-3196 (Fla Cir filed Jan 25, 2002) (available on Westlaw at 2002 WL 
34675377). 
 4 Dana Berliner, Public Power, Private Gain: A Five-Year, State-by-State Report Exam-
ining the Abuse of Eminent Domain *58 (Apr 2003), archived at http://perma.cc/2SJE-7EUM. 
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course,5 and eventually, in 2006, the land was sold to a local 
university at a substantial loss.6 
The wastefulness in this example highlights the potential 
value of an eminent domain compensation standard that, con-
sistent with the indemnity principle, would make the owner 
whole. Were county officials to know and pay the Zamecniks’ 
(presumably) high subjective value of their home, as opposed to 
the constitutionally required7 compensation of its fair market 
value, adding a golf course may have seemed less justified.8 
However, determining exactly how much the Zamecniks valued 
their property is difficult,9 and scholars have struggled to come 
up with practical estimates in such situations.10 This Comment 
proposes using a well-being-analysis approach to estimating the 
subjective valuation of homes such as the Zamecniks’. Such an 
approach involves measuring the effects of eminent domain tak-
ings on reported life-satisfaction levels through surveying indi-
viduals, including people like the Zamecniks, who are involved 
in eminent domain. 
The constitutional record in eminent domain jurisprudence 
expresses a commitment to making individuals such as the 
Zamecniks “whole”11 as part of paying just compensation under 
the Fifth Amendment. However, federal law and the majority of 
states offer only fair market value, which generally undercom-
pensates takees.12 The Supreme Court has settled on fair market 
 
 5 See Collins, Evicted Homeowners, Palm Beach Post at 1A (cited in note 1). 
 6 See Palm Beach County, Florida: Single Audit Report; Fiscal Year Ended Sep-
tember 30, 2006 *104 (Palm Beach County Office of Financial Management and Budget), 
archived at http://perma.cc/4V3U-XELV. 
 7 See Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co v United States, 409 US 470, 473–
74 (1973). 
 8 See Part II.A. 
 9 See Part II.B. 
 10 For a discussion of scholarly attempts to estimate subjective valuation, see Part 
II.B. This Comment responds to a challenge in Professor Richard A. Epstein’s canonical 
work on this topic, in which he defends the use of a 50 percent multiplier premium on fair 
market value in the context of private-to-private takings based on the New Hampshire Mill 
Act but concludes that “in these circumstances one should not demand perfect precision 
because there is no way to provide it.” Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and 
the Power of Eminent Domain 174–75 (Harvard 1985). 
 11 This is the concept of restoring an individual “to [her] original or rightful posi-
tion,” and it includes the individual’s subjective value. Steven D. Smith, The Critics and 
the “Crisis”: A Reassessment of Current Conceptions of Tort Law, 72 Cornell L Rev 765, 
769–71 & nn 16, 22 (1987) (quotation marks omitted).  
 12 For an early discussion of this issue, see generally W. Harold Bigham, “Fair 
Market Value,” “Just Compensation,” and the Constitution: A Critical View, 24 Vand L 
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compensation because revealed-preference approaches to esti-
mating the subjective valuation of homes are generally problem-
atic,13 and approaches that ask individuals to valuate14 their 
property subjectively provide incentives to lie. Courts use this 
second-best solution primarily due to the lack of a practical way 
to estimate subjective value.15 In addition, only a small minority 
of states use adjustments to fair market value estimates to com-
pensate for subjective value, and among those states there is 
disagreement about what the proper adjustment is.16 
The lack of a true indemnity principle is implicated by current 
eminent domain controversies that focus on public use, and even 
members of the Supreme Court have questioned the fairness of 
this absence.17 The strong public reaction18 against the Court’s de-
cision in Kelo v City of New London19 was notable, and at least one 
scholar has argued that the strong reaction to economic-
development eminent domain is due in part to the “paltry compen-
sation” to owners who are excluded from the “benefits of whatever 
renewal (if any) it accomplished.”20 In fact, several justices in the 
 
Rev 63 (1970) (examining how fair market value consistently undercompensates subjects 
of eminent domain, often engendering public discontent with the system). 
 13 See Richard A. Epstein, The Use and Limits of Self-Valuation Systems, 81 U Chi 
L Rev 109, 125 (2014). 
 14 As opposed to the value that an individual’s property could sell for in a fair mar-
ket (the fair market value), the subjective value—in monetary terms—is the minimum 
price that an individual would be willing to accept as compensation for the sale of her 
property. See Thomas J. Miceli, The Economic Theory of Eminent Domain: Private Prop-
erty, Public Use 58 (Cambridge 2011) (discussing subjective value from a supply and de-
mand perspective). 
 15 See Part I.A. 
 16 See Part I.B. 
 17 See notes 124–25 and accompanying text. 
 18 The Economist reported that the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v City of New 
London, 545 US 469 (2005), “has set off a fierce backlash that may yet be as potent as 
the anti-abortion movement.” Hands Off Our Homes (The Economist, Aug 18, 2005), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/BW83-4PV7. The underlying sentiment persisted even several 
years later. In a 2009 survey on constitutional attitudes performed by Knowledge Net-
works for Harvard University and Columbia University, 83.5 percent of respondents in-
dicated that they did not think eminent domain should be used to “transfer[ ] someone’s 
property to private developers whose commercial projects could benefit the local economy.” 
Stephen Ansolabehere and Nathaniel Persily, Field Report: Constitutional Attitudes Survey 
*23, 61 (Knowledge Networks, July 14, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/S4MJ-LX82. 
 19 545 US 469 (2005). 
 20 Eduardo Peñalver, “In Kind” Just Compensation (Concurring Opinions, July 14, 
2006), archived at http://perma.cc/L683-CC7L. This interpretation that the reaction is in 
part about the post–eminent domain distribution of surplus is consistent with the em-
phasis on the acquiring party’s profit that is present in the executive order issued by 
President George W. Bush one year after the Kelo decision. The order committed to limit 
eminent domain to cases in which “the taking is for public use” and is “not merely for the 
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Kelo oral arguments were “bothered” by the undercompensation 
concern that arises from paying only fair market value, with one 
justice pointing out that such undercompensation occurs while a 
private party profits at the original owner’s expense.21 Indeed, 
the opinion itself acknowledged the “importan[ce]” of “questions 
about the fairness of the [fair market value] measure of just 
compensation” raised in the amicus briefs,22 indicating that the 
time may be right to push for a reevaluation of the standard. As 
such, among scholars, the Kelo decision has prompted calls for a 
renewed look at the accepted compensation approach.23 
Despite the seriousness of this problem and the ripeness for 
a solution, there have been no proposals that workably estimate 
the difference between an owner’s subjective valuation of her 
property and the property’s fair market value based on similarly 
situated individuals’ valuations24 (which this Comment refers to 
as the “subjective-value premium”). The lack of a solution means 
that, on average, two thousand (often underprivileged25) individ-
uals per year in the United States are threatened with bearing 
the cost of this difference, and that is counting only “filed or 
 
purpose of advancing the economic interest of private parties to be given ownership.” Ex-
ecutive Order 13406, 3 CFR 235, 235. 
 21 During oral arguments in Kelo, Justice David Souter, for example, said: “[W]hat 
bothered Justice Breyer I guess bothers a lot of us. And that is, is there a problem of 
making the homeowner or the property owner whole? But I suppose the answer to that is 
that goes to the measure of compensation which is not the issue here.” Transcript of Oral 
Argument, Kelo v City of New London, Docket No 04-108, *49 (US Feb 22, 2005) (“Kelo 
Transcript”). In addition, Justice Stephen Breyer pointed out that the takees “want to be 
really not made a lot worse off, at least not made a lot worse off just so some other people 
can get a lot more money.” Id at *50. 
 22 Kelo, 545 US at 489 n 21. 
 23 See, for example, Katrina Miriam Wyman, The Measure of Just Compensation, 
41 UC Davis L Rev 239, 241–42 (2007) (pointing to the “renewed discussion that [Kelo] 
has prompted about how much compensation governments should pay when they take 
people’s homes through eminent domain” and how it has prompted “many proposals to 
increase compensation for takings”). 
 24 Part II.B discusses two proposals that are problematic. While one could be quick-
ly calculated, it would require both a revamping of the tax system to be accurate and a 
significant reduction in taxes. The other falls prey to the endowment effect. 
 25 See Sandra Phillips and Marion R. Sillah, A House Is Not a Home: Effect of Emi-
nent Domain Abuse on the Poor, African Americans, and the Elderly, 36 Housing & Socy 
115, 130 (2009) (reporting that “[t]he data show that the practice of taking private prop-
erty for urban development and redevelopment abuses the rights of the most vulnerable 
citizens,” inflicting burdens on “the poor, African American and elderly citizens in our 
communities”). 
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threatened condemnations for private parties.”26 This Comment 
argues that the Court’s acknowledgement of the problems with 
fair market value and its apparent concern about undercompen-
sation are an invitation to create a practical measurement that 
is more accurate than fair market value. A well-being analysis, 
which uses hedonic psychology to measure and collect data on 
changes in people’s subjective well-being in response to various 
events, could be applied to provide the workable solution that 
Fifth Amendment jurisprudence requires. By using regressions 
on individuals’ assessments of their own levels of happiness in 
longitudinal surveys, hedonic psychology can assign a financial 
value to intangible losses.27 
The advances that a well-being analysis offers in valuation 
techniques give courts an opportunity to deviate from the fair 
market value measure of compensation. Such analysis has the 
potential to render inapplicable the Supreme Court’s assump-
tion underlying the current determination of fair market value 
as just compensation. Specifically, a well-being analysis would 
provide courts with an estimate of the hedonic costs of the own-
er’s displacement from a home for which she is paid only fair 
market value, and it would assign these costs a monetary value 
so that courts could add them to the fair market value of the 
taken property. In addition, this approach can be used to assess 
state laws that provide supra–fair market value compensation 
and to inform future laws with the same aim. 
This Comment provides a justification for this approach and 
estimates the average subjective-value premium using the best 
data source available. Part I summarizes the current state of the 
law for increasing compensation above the fair market value at 
both the state and federal levels, and it shows that there is room 
in courts and state legislatures for a well-being-analysis ap-
proach to compensation. Part II situates a well-being-analysis 
approach in the theoretical debate about the costs and benefits 
of compensation above fair market value. It then shows how a 
 
 26 Berliner, Public Power, Private Gain at *2 (cited in note 4) (finding over ten 
thousand documented “instance[s] of actual or threatened condemnation for private par-
ties” within the five-year period from 1998 to 2002). 
 27 See, for example, Irina D. Manta, Hedonic Trademarks, 74 Ohio St L J 241, 268–
71 (2013) (proposing a calculation of the hedonic loss to consumers in terms of how they 
experience goods to inform when confusion in the trademark context should be actionable); 
Andrew J. Oswald and Nattavudh Powdthavee, Death, Happiness, and the Calculation of 
Compensatory Damages, 37 J Legal Stud S217, S218 (2008) (suggesting methods of be-
reavement valuation using hedonic psychology). 
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rigorous well-being-analysis approach addresses some of the 
concerns that have been raised, and it helps assign a nonarbi-
trary lower-bound value. Part III provides the empirical results 
of an estimate of the hedonic costs associated with being paid 
only the fair market value for one’s home—results that are ob-
tained by using data from the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS), an eighteen-year longitudinal survey that covers over 
eight thousand unique moves while surveying individuals about 
their happiness levels before and after each move. The results in 
Part III provide an example of a workable approach to estimat-
ing subjective value, providing empirical support for a multiplier 
of 22 percent that should be applied to the fair market value for 
compensation in eminent domain actions. As such, the results 
not only vindicate the more widespread adoption of state-level 
statutory multipliers but also suggest that courts may be able to 
adopt a well-being-analysis approach to valuation. 
I.  LEGAL BACKGROUND: JUST COMPENSATION AND WELL-BEING 
ANALYSIS UNDER CURRENT FEDERAL AND STATE LAW 
The current approach to just compensation in eminent do-
main takings under US constitutional law avoids difficult calcu-
lations and errs on the side of undercompensation by using the 
independently verifiable standard of fair market value.28 States, 
on the other hand, have been more willing to compensate owners 
above fair market value—but there is significant variation 
across states in their assessments of the proper way to do so. 
A. “Just Compensation” as Fair Market Value: An 
Undercompensating Compromise Born out of Empirical 
Limitations 
In Olson v United States,29 the Court noted that the Takings 
Clause entitles the original property owner “to be put in as good 
a position pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken,” as 
“[h]e must be made whole.”30 At the same time, the Supreme 
 
 28 See notes 12–16 and accompanying text. 
 29 292 US 246 (1934). 
 30 Id at 254–55. See also United States v Miller, 317 US 369, 373 (1943) (“The owner 
is to be put in as good position pecuniarily as he would have occupied if his property had 
not been taken.”). But see Olson, 292 US at 255–56 (stating that compensation “is the 
market value of the property at the time of the taking contemporaneously paid in mon-
ey” and that “[c]onsiderations that may not reasonably be held to affect market value are 
excluded”). 
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Court has interpreted the just compensation requirement of the 
Fifth Amendment to mean that “the owner is entitled to the fair 
market value of his property at the time of the taking”31—though 
the Court has also admitted that “[t]he term ‘fair’ hardly adds 
anything to the phrase ‘market value.’”32 Roughly speaking,33 
fair market value is “what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a 
willing seller.”34 This is true even when the value of the property 
to the owner is based on elements that cannot be transferred:35 
in such cases, the court considers only the “value transferable 
from one owner to another.”36 
These two commitments in the jurisprudence—to make in-
dividuals whole but also to compensate based only on fair mar-
ket value—are in tension with each other. As Judge Richard 
Posner has pointed out, the fair market value shows only the 
value that the “marginal owner attaches to his property,” and 
because the property owner may be “intramarginal,” 
“[c]ompensation in the constitutional sense is therefore not full 
compensation.”37 Indeed, a revealed-preferences argument shows 
that the fair market value will be below the subjective value in 
reasonably functioning real estate markets: an owner always 
has the option of selling her property for the fair market value, 
and the fact that she has not done so reveals that the value of 
the property combined with the value of not having to move ex-
ceeds the property’s fair market value.38 
One justification for the fair market value standard that 
tracks the dicta in the cases is that the fair market value standard 
 
 31 Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co v United States, 409 US 470, 474 (1973). 
 32 Miller, 317 US at 374. 
 33 The nuances of how fair market value is calculated are outside the scope of this 
Comment. 
 34 Almota Farmers, 409 US at 474, quoting Miller, 317 US at 374. See also City of 
New York v Sage, 239 US 57, 61 (1915) (“[W]hat the owner is entitled to is the value of the 
property taken, and that means what it fairly may be believed that a purchaser in fair 
market conditions would have given for it.”); David L. Callies and Shelley Ross Saxer, Is 
Fair Market Value Just Compensation? An Underlying Issue Surfaced in Kelo, in Dwight 
H. Merriam and Mary Massaron Ross, eds, Eminent Domain Use and Abuse: Kelo in Con-
text 137, 137 (ABA 2006).  
 35 For examples of nontransferables that are not included in fair market value—
such as idiosyncratic customizations, neighborhood goodwill, or pleasant memories asso-
ciated with the home—see Part II.A.1. 
 36 Kimball Laundry Co v United States, 338 US 1, 5 (1949). 
 37 Coniston Corp v Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F2d 461, 464 (7th Cir 1988) 
(emphasis in original). 
 38 Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 Mich St L Rev 957, 963 
(“Most property owners value their property above fair market value; if they did not, 
they likely would have sold it already.”). 
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is a compromise acknowledging both the practical difficulty in 
ascertaining subjective valuations and the need for fairness.39 A 
concern for practicality is evident even in the first case in which 
the Supreme Court used the fair market value standard, which 
the Court described as “readily estimated.”40 Concerns for ad-
ministrative ease again showed up in subsequent cases in which 
the Court defended the fair market value standard against 
claims that it was not “just compensation.”41 
The case that most directly discusses the Court’s under-
standing of this tension and of how fair market value is a neces-
sary compromise is United States v 564.54 Acres of Land,42 in 
which the eminent domain takee was a nonprofit organization 
that operated summer camps. The takee demanded more than 
the fair market value of the property, asking to be paid the 
amount that it would cost to obtain “functionally equivalent 
substitute facilities at a new site.”43 The Court rejected the ar-
gument that the takee must truly be made whole, on the ground 
that doing so would have been impractical: 
In giving content to the just compensation requirement of 
the Fifth Amendment, this Court has sought to put the 
owner of condemned property “in as good a position pecuni-
arily as if his property had not been taken.” However, this 
principle of indemnity has not been given its full and literal 
force. Because of serious practical difficulties in assessing 
the worth an individual places on particular property at a 
given time, we have . . . employed the concept of fair market 
value to determine the condemnee’s loss. . . . [T]he Court 
has acknowledged that such an award does not necessarily 
 
 39 See Wyman, 41 UC Davis L Rev at 252–53 (cited in note 23) (discussing this ap-
parent contradiction and noting that “the Court has suggested that subjective indifference 
is not a practical objective for takings compensation because it is nearly impossible for an 
outsider to accurately determine how much an owner subjectively values his or her losses”). 
 40 Boom Co v Patterson, 98 US (8 Otto) 403, 408 (1878). 
 41 United States v Commodities Trading Corp, 339 US 121, 124–26 (1950) (accept-
ing a fair market value of the current ceiling price that was not adjusted to include a re-
tention value, because “[a] persuasive reason against the general rule . . . is the highly 
speculative nature of proof to show possible future prices on which ‘retention value’ must 
depend”). See also, for example, United States v Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co, 229 
US 53, 80 (1913) (stating that the fact “[t]hat the property may have to the public a 
greater value than its fair market value affords no just criterion for estimating what the 
owner should receive,” and rejecting the additional value of the property—which the 
owner wanted to include—as “altogether speculative”). 
 42 441 US 506 (1979). 
 43 Id at 508. 
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compensate for all values an owner may derive from his 
property.44 
In contrast to the “serious practical difficulties” associated with 
estimating individual worth, the Court stated that the fair mar-
ket value was “readily discernible.”45 Indeed, one state supreme 
court justice interpreted this case and the Fifth Amendment ju-
risprudence of using fair market value “even when fair market 
value may not fully compensate the landowner” as an “attempt 
to achieve a workable rule.”46 
In Kimball Laundry Co v United States,47 Justice Felix 
Frankfurter rejected a valuation of property based on a subjec-
tive approach in favor of fair market valuation because 
[a]s opposed to such personal and variant standards as val-
ue to the particular owner whose property has been taken, 
this transferable value has an external validity which 
makes it a fair measure of public obligation to compensate 
the loss incurred by an owner as a result of the taking of his 
property for public use.48 
Here, the Court rooted its defense of the fair market value 
standard in its “external validity” and implicitly demonstrated a 
concern with the validity of standards that consider personal 
value to a particular owner. The fairness of the fair market val-
ue approach, therefore, is based on its greater “external validity” 
compared to other methods, rather than on its ability to make 
the individual owner whole.49 
It is also worth noting that the Court has discussed excep-
tions to the general preference for using a fair market value ap-
proach. For example, in dicta, the Court has pointed to the fact 
that when a fair market value approach “would result in manifest 
injustice to owner or public, courts have fashioned and applied 
 
 44 Id at 510–11, quoting Olson, 292 US at 255 (citations omitted). 
 45 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 US at 511, 514. 
 46 Religious of the Sacred Heart of Texas v City of Houston, 836 SW2d 606, 618 (Tex 
1992) (Cornyn concurring). 
 47 338 US 1 (1949). 
 48 Id at 5. 
 49 It is worth noting that, in the past, Canadian law included subjective valuation 
in its determination of just compensation. Up until 1970, Ontario and the federal gov-
ernment of Canada determined compensation based on “value to the owner,” but they 
eventually adopted a fair market value approach due in part to the difficulties in esti-
mating subjective value. Jack L. Knetsch and Thomas E. Borcherding, Expropriation of 
Private Property and the Basis for Compensation, 29 U Toronto L J 237, 238–39 (1979). 
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other standards.”50 The cases that the Court cited here, however, 
are largely consistent with fair market valuation, since they are 
flexible as to when the fair market value is determined by disre-
garding certain components of that value at the time of the tak-
ing rather than rejecting the fair market value approach entire-
ly.51 As such, the “manifest injustice” standard is best suited for 
reducing compensation from the fair market value at the time of 
the taking rather than justifying an increase due to high subjec-
tive valuation. 
These cases demonstrate that the Court’s commitment to 
fair market valuation, despite its failure to leave the owner 
whole, is triggered by the lack of manageable approaches with 
“external validity”52 that might be better in this respect. Espe-
cially in light of the Court’s concern about fair market value as 
expressed in Kelo, these cases create an opportunity for a supe-
rior method of estimating subjective value—one that is not high-
ly “speculative.”53 Such a method would disrupt the calculation 
underlying the fair market value compromise. As argued below, 
a well-being-analysis approach does exactly that: by offering a 
workable way to estimate subjective value with external valida-
tion,54 it allows courts to come closer to making owners whole. It 
thus better coheres with the principles underlying just compen-
sation jurisprudence without introducing significant accuracy 
costs. 
B. State Provisions for Supra–Fair Market Value 
Compensation 
While the majority of states follow the federal approach and 
accept the fair market value as just compensation,55 some states 
 
 50 Commodities Trading Corp, 339 US at 123. 
 51 See Miller, 317 US at 372–77 (finding that, although a declaration of taking was 
filed by the Government in December 1938, the jury instructions to consider “market 
value at the date of the taking, excluding therefrom any increment of value accruing af-
ter August 26, 1937,” were acceptable to avoid the Government’s paying for an “increase 
in value . . . aris[ing] from speculation”); Olson, 292 US at 253–55, 261 (disregarding “el-
ements of value arising from the prospect that the Government would acquire the flow-
age easements,” and effectively moving back the time of assessment of market value, as 
“[u]nder the circumstances, intention to acquire was the equivalent of the formal desig-
nation of the property to be taken”). 
 52 Kimball Laundry, 338 US at 5. 
 53 Chandler-Dunbar Water Power, 229 US at 80. 
 54 See Part II.C. 
 55 See, for example, Ala Code § 18-1A-172 (“The fair market value . . . shall be de-
fined as the price the property would bring when offered for sale by a willing seller who 
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require that individuals be paid more than the fair market value 
when eminent domain is pursued by state and local entities. In 
eminent domain actions initiated by state and local govern-
ments, compensation must meet the standard that applies under 
the Fifth Amendment—but these actions are also constrained by 
state and local statutes,56 which occasionally provide additional 
just compensation requirements. In some states, supra–fair 
market value compensation is done through a fair market value 
multiplier. For example, in Indiana57 and Rhode Island,58 in ad-
dition to paying the fair market value, the purchaser must pay a 
50 percent multiplier of that fair market value plus the costs re-
lated to the transfer of ownership and to relocation. Similarly, in 
Connecticut,59 Michigan,60 and Missouri,61 the floor for compen-
sation in a taking of an individual’s principal residence is 125 
percent of the property’s fair market value. In the case of a 
property that has been in the owner’s family for fifty years or 
longer, Missouri adds “heritage value,” which is 50 percent of 
the fair market value, to the fair market value.62 This variation 
raises the question of which state multiplier is more consistent 
with the average subjective-value premium. 
The majority of states that authorize compensation in ex-
cess of fair market value focus on expenses that do not show up 
in fair market value but that seem easier to measure than sub-
jective value. California,63 Illinois,64 Louisiana,65 Maryland,66 
 
is not forced to sell and which is sought by a willing buyer who is not required to buy.”); 
State v Alaska Continental Development Corp, 630 P2d 977, 991 (Alaska 1980) (confirm-
ing that the law in Alaska on condemnation appraisals is that fair market value is the 
“appropriate measure” of just compensation). 
 56 See Ilya Somin, The Grasping Hand: Kelo v. City of New London and the Limits 
of Eminent Domain 3 (Chicago 2015).  
 57 Ind Code Ann § 32-24-4.5-8 (imposing a 150 percent multiplier for residential 
property, as well as a 125 percent multiplier for farmland). 
 58 RI Gen Laws § 42-64.12-8. 
 59 Conn Gen Stat Ann § 8-129(a)(2) (stating that “the compensation for any real 
property to be acquired by eminent domain . . . shall be one hundred twenty-five per 
cent” of the average of two independent appraisals of the land). 
 60 Mich Const Art X, § 2.  
 61 Mo Rev Stat §§ 523.001(3), 523.039. 
 62 Mo Rev Stat §§ 523.001(2), 523.039. 
 63 Cal Gov Code Ann § 7262. 
 64 735 ILCS 30/10-5-62. 
 65 La Rev Stat Ann § 19:9. See also City of Baton Rouge/Parish of East Baton 
Rouge v Broussard, 834 S2d 665, 667–68 (La App 2002) (referring to the language in the 
Louisiana statute and finding that “the cost of relocation, inconvenience and loss of prof-
its is compensable under this provision”). 
 66 MD Real Prop Code Ann § 12-205. 
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Massachusetts,67 Mississippi,68 Tennessee,69 and West Virginia70 
require the payment of a takee’s relocation expenses. Minnesota 
requires that just compensation for a person displaced by a tak-
ing be sufficient “to purchase a comparable property in the 
community,” which under certain circumstances may signifi-
cantly exceed the fair market value of the condemned property.71 
In Michigan, an individual can claim “compensation for damage 
caused by the taking, apart from the value of the property tak-
en.”72 Connecticut law sets up a fund for relocation expenses.73 In 
addition to these state laws, state and local projects that receive 
federal funds must comply with the Uniform Relocation Assis-
tance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970,74 which 
requires them to provide relocation assistance in cases of emi-
nent domain acquisitions.75 
The variation in compensation levels across states is signifi-
cant, and the more common approach of covering relocation ex-
penses could be based on the same discomfort that the Court has 
exhibited with the fuzziness of estimating subjective value. A 
well-being analysis might encourage a state legislature eschew-
ing a multiplier to reconsider this assessment, and it might help 
identify which of the existing state multipliers comes closest to 
making takees whole. 
 
 67 Mass Gen Laws Ann ch 79A, § 7. 
 68 Miss Code § 43-39-7. 
 69 Tenn Code Ann § 29-16-114. 
 70 W Va Code § 54-3 (requiring that the federal coverage of relocation expenses pro-
vided under certain circumstances in the Surface Transportation and Uniform Reloca-
tion Assistance Act of 1987 apply in state eminent domain actions). 
 71 Minn Stat § 117.187. See also County of Dakota v Cameron, 839 NW2d 700, 704–
05, 712 (Minn 2013) (affirming the district court’s award of damages in the amount of 
$997,055.84 under Minn Stat § 117.187, even though the plaintiff ’s condemned property 
was appraised at no more than $560,300). 
 72 Mich Comp Laws § 213.55(5)(3)(a). 
 73 Conn Gen Stat §§ 8-266 to -268; Conn Agencies Regs § 8-273-13. Moving costs 
are included as part of the value of the property. See Stanley Works v New Britain Rede-
velopment Agency, 230 A2d 9, 17–18 (Conn 1967) (finding that, for determining fair mar-
ket value, “[o]ne factor which a trier may consider is the expense an owner is compelled 
to incur in moving machinery from the condemned property to another location,” but not 
counting it under the circumstances because the plaintiff had completed the move prior 
to the taking and thus the “moving cost could not be considered as a factor affecting the 
property’s value”). 
 74 Pub L No 91-646, 84 Stat 1894, codified as amended at 42 USC § 4601 et seq. 
 75 42 USC §§ 4621–38. 
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C. Consistency of Well-Being Analysis with Other Areas of 
the Law 
This Comment proposes the use of a well-being-analysis ap-
proach to respond to the Supreme Court’s invitation for a rigor-
ous estimation of subjective valuation. Thus, it is worth examin-
ing the extent to which such a well-being analysis, in which 
reports of subjective well-being are used to estimate damages, is 
similar to currently accepted valuation methods in legal analysis. 
It is easier to understand what a well-being analysis would 
look like outside of the eminent domain context. Perhaps the 
clearest example of such an analysis is in the recent call for us-
ing “happiness regression” well-being analyses to calculate com-
pensatory damages in wrongful death suits,76 as well as in 
wrongful injury suits in response to injuries causing disability.77 
In the former setting, a longitudinal data set that included life-
satisfaction metrics reflecting both how happy an individual was 
at a given point in time and factors that one would generally ex-
pect to influence happiness was the source for the well-being es-
timates.78 Professors Andrew Oswald and Nattavudh Powdthavee 
calculated damages for the death of a loved one by using regres-
sions of these factors and whether there was a death in the fami-
ly against the reported happiness levels before and after the 
loss.79 In the disability setting, a similar regression analysis on 
the same data set testing for how the loss of limbs affected hap-
piness demonstrated that the happiness effects of disabilities 
are relevant to damages for pain and suffering in cases involving 
disabilities.80 In both of these studies, the authors proposed that 
the traditional goal of tort law of making the plaintiff “whole” 
can be met by estimating the negative effect on happiness 
caused by the type of events in question and by then converting 
that effect into monetary terms.81 
 
 76 Oswald and Powdthavee, 37 J Legal Stud at S220 (cited in note 27). 
 77 See Andrew J. Oswald and Nattavudh Powdthavee, Does Happiness Adapt? A 
Longitudinal Study of Disability with Implications for Economists and Judges, 92 J Pub 
Econ 1061, 1067 (2008). 
 78 See Oswald and Powdthavee, 37 J Legal Stud at S223–26 (cited in note 27). 
 79 Id at S220. 
 80 See Oswald and Powdthavee, 92 J Pub Econ at 1071 (cited in note 77) (“[T]he 
general idea remains one that may eventually have practical application for lawyers and 
judges: happiness equations potentially give a way of estimating the sums of money re-
quired to compensate people for bad life events.”) (emphasis added). 
 81 Oswald and Powdthavee, 37 J Legal Stud at S218, S220 (cited in note 27); Oswald 
and Powdthavee, 92 J Pub Econ at 1071 (cited in note 77). 
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The calls in these articles for the use of happiness regres-
sions within legal cases have not resulted in actual damages cal-
culations, but considering average hedonic impacts for the pur-
pose of valuation is legally permissible. Perhaps the clearest 
case establishing this is Sherrod v Berry,82 in which the court 
considered the admissibility of expert testimony that allowed a 
jury to consider the “hedonic value of a human life” in estimat-
ing damages related to the lost companionship between a father 
and a son upon the death of the son.83 The court allowed testi-
mony from an expert witness who cited a study showing that the 
hedonic value of a life could be calculated by applying a multi-
plier to the deceased individual’s expected earnings.84 While the 
jury had the right to reject such evidence, this case establishes 
the potential value of hedonic approaches in helping to value 
goods that do not have a market value. 
While the expert was not offering a happiness regression 
(the inference of value is from consumption decisions85 and sur-
vey data about willingness to pay86), the method of analysis does 
have some similarities to a happiness regression. First of all, the 
article cited by the expert relied in part on surveys in which in-
dividuals needed to self-assess,87 and thus the value was not 
simply inferred from individual actions. In addition, like well-
being analyses, the potential multipliers that were provided at-
tempted to assign a value to a good that did not have a market 
value. Finally, aggregate data from other individuals were used to 
infer the value for one individual that could be applied through a 
multiplier. In addition to the existence of these similarities, the 
calculation of emotional impacts is generally left to the jury’s 
discretion, with little guidance for valuation techniques.88 Thus, 
 
 82 629 F Supp 159 (ND Ill 1985), revd on other grounds, 856 F2d 802 (7th Cir 1988). 
 83 Sherrod, 629 F Supp at 160. 
 84 Id at 163 (discussing how the expert referenced fifteen economics studies discuss-
ing the value of life and also cited a metastudy finding that “there was a relationship 
somewhere in the dimension of three times up to 30 times their economic productive in-
come” as an estimate of “the hedonic value of life”). The cited study surveys academic 
literature “estimat[ing] the theoretically relevant value of life which is one based on in-
dividual willingness to pay rather than some calculation of future earnings.” Glenn 
Blomquist, The Value of Human Life: An Empirical Perspective, 19 Econ Inquiry 157, 
158–62 (1981). 
 85 See Blomquist, 19 Econ Inquiry at 159 (cited in note 84). 
 86 See id at 158–59. 
 87 Id at 159–60 (describing the two studies involved as “seek[ing] to determine a 
value of life by asking people how much they will pay”). 
 88 See Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping 
Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 Cal L Rev 773, 777, 841 
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although no opinions have cited a well-being analysis for calcu-
lating damages, such evidence appears to be admissible given 
the substantial latitude within the law for hedonic approaches 
and given the estimate’s similarity to the estimates provided in 
analyses of the hedonic value of life. 
II.  WELL-BEING ANALYSIS AS AN ATTRACTIVE APPROACH TO JUST 
COMPENSATION 
This Part establishes why a well-being analysis is a neces-
sary and well-suited response to the tension between making an 
individual whole and the need for workable standards that in-
heres in the just compensation jurisprudence. 
There are many reasons that an individual might value her 
home at more than its fair market value,89 and scholars have ar-
gued that ignoring this difference leads to inefficiencies and in-
justices.90 These reasons are discussed in Part II.A. Though the 
Court has provided only a sketch of alternative approaches to 
just compensation and the difficulties in their execution, there is 
a substantial body of literature specifically regarding eminent 
domain takings that aims to provide a basis for supra–fair mar-
ket value compensation. Part II.B covers these approaches as 
well as some of their limitations. While these approaches fall 
prey to valuation concerns, a well-being analysis that uses indi-
vidual happiness levels after a move in an attempt to estimate a 
subjective-value premium can take into account many of these 
concerns and still provide robust value estimates, consistent 
with the Court’s compromise. Covering these benefits of a well-
being analysis, Part II.C argues that such an approach can 
make compensation in the context of eminent domain actions 
more efficient and just. 
 
(1995) (noting that “[s]tudies have shown that jury awards for pain and suffering vary 
widely for injuries that appear to be equally severe” and that “[t]his lack of uniformity 
introduces an element of unpredictability into the tort system,” but also noting that, 
“[n]evertheless, jurors are not presently provided with the guidance that would help 
them to understand how injury severity should be translated into a monetary award”). 
 89 See Fennell, 2004 Mich St L Rev at 963–64 (cited in note 38). 
 90 See, for example, Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, Taking Compensa-
tion Private, 59 Stan L Rev 871, 877–85, 890 (2007) (surveying “competing theories [that] 
have been proposed to explain [the] purpose and scope [of just compensation],” including 
“fairness-based justifications” and “efficiency-based justifications,” and concluding that 
“fairness and efficiency theories require payment of full compensation at the property 
owner’s value in those cases where compensation is warranted”). 
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A. Why Supra–Fair Market Value Compensation Is a Better 
Approach, and the Source of the Practical Problems 
An owner’s subjective valuation of her home is likely to ex-
ceed its fair market value due to customizations based on the 
homeowner’s preferences, intangibles associated with the home 
that cannot be transferred (such as memories), and relocation 
costs. The fair market value standard thus invites allocative in-
efficiencies.91 Part II.A.1 covers some of the nontransferable as-
pects of a home that can cause subjective valuation to be higher 
than the home’s fair market value, and Part II.A.2 explains why 
these aspects matter. 
1. Reasons why subjective value might exceed the fair 
market value. 
It is a well-accepted fact that a homeowner may have a sub-
jective value of her home that exceeds its fair market value.92 
There are many factors that might drive a wedge between the 
total value that an individual places on her home and her 
home’s fair market value. 
One source of this subjective value is the idiosyncratic custom-
izations that individuals make to their homes. In the United 
States, home renovations represent a substantial cost to home-
owners,93 and many of these renovations will have much more 
value to the residents than they will ever have in resale value. 
On average, a homeowner will recoup less than $0.67 for every 
$1.00 she spends on home-improvement projects.94 This makes 
sense because homeowners spend money on making their houses 
consistent with their individual preferences, and future buyers 
are likely to have different preferences and to either value the 
improvements less or make other renovations that are con-
sistent with their own tastes. The combination of the large 
amount spent on improvement projects and their low market 
 
 91 The term “allocative inefficiencies” refers to the utility that is lost when property 
is transferred from higher-value to lower-value users. 
 92 For an early statement of this idea, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of 
Public Use, 72 Cornell L Rev 61, 83 (1986) (observing that owners may place on their 
properties “subjective premium[s]” that are above fair market value). 
 93 See Kris Hudson, Americans Boost Spending on Remodeling (Wall St J, Feb 3, 
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/5E6G-8AUS (citing data from the US Census Bureau 
indicating that in 2013, homeowners spent $130 billion on remodeling projects). 
 94 Erica Christoffer, 2013-14 Cost vs. Value: Remodeling Pays Off Big Time 
(REALTOR Magazine, Jan 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/7LKT-VSFF (citing a “na-
tionwide cost-value average of 66.1 percent” in a survey covering thirty-five projects). 
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value returns suggests that there is a large gap between the 
subjective value of homes and their fair market value. 
Perhaps the most well-known source of the subjective value 
of a home that is not part of the fair market valuation is the 
memories that the owner associates with the home. Happy 
memories are an example of a component of subjective valuation 
that is much more difficult to valuate because they are intangi-
ble and inalienable. A divergence between the subjective and 
fair market values can occur because memories cannot be trans-
ferred to a buyer.95 Professor Lee Fennell aptly compares the 
subjective valuation of a home to that of a used wedding ring: 
Even though there is a market for used wedding rings, created 
by some individuals who sell their rings to raise cash quickly, 
these individuals are likely not those with sentimental attach-
ments to their rings. It would be incorrect to use the price at 
which they sell their rings to estimate the value that a more 
sentimental person—who has chosen not to sell—has when she 
puts on her wedding ring.96 Another source is the lost goodwill 
that occurs when an individual moves out of her neighborhood.97 
Being forced to move means having to start all over again in es-
tablishing relationships with neighbors. 
Finally, the relocation costs of moving to a new home are also 
part of an individual’s subjective value of her home.98 Moving has 
substantial costs99 that may not be encapsulated in the fair mar-
ket value of the property. A homeowner’s value of her home in-
cludes her valuation of not having to move—indeed, some indi-
viduals may choose to buy a home rather than rent because they 
do not want to live subject to the whim of a landlord who can 
choose not to renew a lease. This value will not be priced into the 
 
 95 See Lee Anne Fennell, Just Enough, 113 Colum L Rev Sidebar 109, 112 (2013) 
(arguing that such characteristics are nontransferable and are unlikely to be included in 
the fair market value). 
 96 Id at 114.  
 97 See Merrill, 72 Cornell L Rev at 83 (cited in note 92). Note that while the topic of 
lost business goodwill is relevant for eminent domain involving businesses, it is outside 
the scope of this Comment because happiness surveys cannot be administered to assess 
corporate well-being.  
 98 Id.  
 99 See generally, for example, Jeanne M. Brett, Job Transfer and Well-Being, 67 J 
Applied Psychology 450 (1982) (examining the strain that moving may place on relation-
ships); Sally Ann Shumaker and Daniel Stokols, Residential Mobility as a Social Issue 
and Research Topic, 38 J Soc Issues 1 (Fall 1982) (offering an overview of mobility’s im-
pact on both family-specific and national well-being). 
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home,100 and thus part of the subjective valuation of a home is 
the moving cost saved by staying there. 
2. Arguments for including “something more,” and some 
responses. 
As demonstrated in this Part, economic theory and distribu-
tive justice theory converge in establishing the relevance of sub-
jective valuation for eminent domain takings. Economists point 
to the inefficiencies that result from the misallocation that can 
occur under eminent domain if undercompensation is systemic. 
Others reach the same conclusion about the need for subjective 
valuation by pointing to the deep dignitary harms present when 
one is paid only the fair market value for her property. Both ap-
proaches weigh in favor of considering subjective value. 
The economic costs of using the fair market value standard 
occur when land moves to a lower-value user.101 Allocative effi-
ciency requires that no good be transferred from a user who val-
ues it more to a user who values it less. But fair market value 
compensation does not guarantee such a result. Under fair mar-
ket value compensation, proposed eminent domain takings that 
meet the standard for public use will be incentivized if 
Value of Home to Taker > Fair Market Value. 
However, the fact that the individual has not moved implies that 
Value of Home to Owner > Fair Market Value, 
and there is no reason to infer that the owner’s value is lower 
than the taker’s value. Thus, there is no guarantee that the tak-
er’s valuation is higher than the owner’s valuation of the proper-
ty—while this may be true in some cases, it need not necessarily 
 
 100 This is because in well-behaved property markets, one would expect investment 
buyers to be the marginal purchasers. Such buyers may purchase in order to rent the 
property out to others, with the result that the premium for getting to avoid the incon-
venience of moving costs will not be part of the housing price since the house is a rental. 
See Fennell, 2004 Mich St L Rev at 963 (cited in note 38) (considering “the out-of-pocket 
cost of moving to another place” to be a component of subjective value that “do[es] not 
enhance fair market value”).  
 101 At times, this Comment discusses the possibility of eminent domain as if a pri-
vate actor were using it to reach the property of another. This is because, at least in theory, 
private parties may be able to take advantage of eminent domain. See, for example, 
Southwestern Illinois Development Authority v National City Environmental, LLC, 768 
NE2d 1, 10 (Ill 2002) (finding that the “condemnation clearly was intended to assist [a pri-
vate entity] in accomplishing their goals in a swift, economical, and profitable manner”). 
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be true.102 Here, the cost of the taking is not fully internalized by 
the taker because the taker pays less than the cost imposed to the 
owner by eminent domain.103 Such a standard therefore invites 
allocative-efficiency concerns,104 especially when one considers the 
municipal-finance incentives that may make it possible for a gov-
ernment to purchase property even when the property’s value to 
the municipality is below its fair market value.105 
This is not to say that a world where eminent domain tak-
ings are not allowed in the first place is more efficient: absent 
such takings, one must worry about strategic holdouts.106 The 
economic literature has well established the fact that strategic 
holdouts can keep property from being transferred even when 
Value of Home to Taker > Value of Home to Owner, 
because the property owner will try to extract all the surplus 
that will come from the taker’s use of the property.107 An im-
passe could occur due to diverging estimates of each party’s bar-
gaining power and due to the strategic behavior of each party in 
trying to hold out to be the last seller and to extract the total 
value from the buyer. However, one cannot expect fair market 
 
 102 For a similar discussion concluding that the use of eminent domain with a fair 
market value standard may lead to allocative inefficiencies, see Thomas S. Ulen, The 
Public Use of Private Property: A Dual-Constraint Theory of Efficient Governmental Tak-
ings, in Nicholas Mercuro, ed, Taking Property and Just Compensation: Law and Eco-
nomics Perspectives of the Takings Issue 163, 169–71 (Kluwer Academic 1992). 
 103 For an argument about the importance of internalizing costs and its centrality to 
the law, see Robert D. Cooter and Ariel Porat, Getting Incentives Right: Improving Torts, 
Contracts, and Restitution 61–68 (Princeton 2014). 
 104 It is worth noting that at least one economist who has defended the fair market 
value approach argues that such distortions need to be weighed against the incremental 
distortions that would be caused by the increase in taxes required to fund the gap be-
tween fair market value and subjective value. See Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of 
Law 65 (Aspen 5th ed 1998) (“[A] requirement of paying just compensation implies high-
er taxes (or tax substitutes such as inflation or public debt) than if there were no such 
requirement; and taxes . . . create misallocative effects.”). 
 105 See, for example, William A. Fischel, The Political Economy of Public Use in 
Poletown: How Federal Grants Encourage Excessive Use of Eminent Domain, 2004 Mich 
St L Rev 929, 953 (arguing that “[a]bove-market compensation [ ] did not address the 
essential problem of the Poletown takings”—namely, “that Detroit did not have to put up 
much of its own money (either from its own taxes or from fungible grant money) to do the 
Poletown project”). 
 106 See Miceli, The Economic Theory of Eminent Domain at 27–35 (cited in note 14). 
 107 See Thomas W. Merrill, Book Review, Rent Seeking and the Compensation Prin-
ciple, 80 Nw U L Rev 1561, 1570 (1987) (noting that eminent domain “traditionally has 
been employed to promote a more efficient allocation of resources by overcoming holdouts 
and free riders”). 
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value compensation through eminent domain to always generate 
efficient allocations in resolving this holdout problem. 
Scholars have reached the same conclusion by pointing to 
the inherent injustice of compensation that is for only the fair 
market value of the property in the context of eminent domain. 
This approach is apparent in Professor Epstein’s classic work 
Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain.108 
Another example of this approach is the argument advanced by 
Professor Rachel Godsil and attorney David Simunovich, who 
argue that the undercompensation engendered by fair market 
value means that some will not be able to purchase another home, 
leading to the “loss of one’s status as a homeowner.”109 Finally, the 
concern about the fundamental injustice of takers getting wind-
fall gains while owners are undercompensated can play an im-
portant role in arguments that compensation should reflect some 
of the surplus generated through eminent domain.110 
One important response to both the efficiency and the fair-
ness concerns is Professor Nicole Garnett’s argument that takers 
may have incentives to avoid taking properties from owners with 
high subjective values and that potential takers may bargain to 
pay more than the eminent domain takings amount, meaning 
that the inefficiencies of the fair market value standard may be 
overstated.111 Garnett argues that because of the political conse-
quences, takers are likely to avoid seeking high-subjective-value 
properties that are “important to a cohesive community of politi-
cally powerful owners.”112 As she admits, however, this channel is 
unlikely to protect groups who are traditionally considered politi-
cally powerless, and thus undercompensation still remains a 
 
 108 Epstein, Takings at 182–84 (cited in note 10).  
 109 Rachel D. Godsil and David Simunovich, Just Compensation in an Ownership 
Society, in Robin Paul Malloy, ed, Private Property, Community Development, and Emi-
nent Domain 133, 134 (Ashgate 2008). 
 110 See, for example, Michael Heller and Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 
Harv L Rev 1465, 1477–78, 1480 (2008) (discussing how the Supreme Court’s approach 
to compensation is an “apparent injustice,” as “failure to pay over some share of the as-
sembly value to condemnees deprives them of value that landowners normally retain,” 
while ultimately arguing that in the land-assembly context, “if different procedures could 
gauge subjective valuation more cheaply and effectively, there is little doubt that such 
procedures would be more just”). 
 111 Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 
Mich L Rev 101, 104–05 (2006). 
 112 Id at 118. See also id at 114–15 (discussing how plans for a Chicago expressway 
were changed three times to avoid disrupting the parish boundaries of a particularly 
large Polish Catholic church). 
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concern.113 In addition, Garnett argues that potential takers may 
wish to avoid the legal costs associated with the eminent domain 
process, providing an example of a 2000 economic-development 
project in South Bend, Indiana, in which the owners were paid by 
AM General, on average, 141 percent of the appraised value of 
their properties—an amount that included relocation assistance.114 
While the point that sometimes individuals may receive more 
than fair market value compensation is well taken, the particular 
pressures in that situation—such as time pressure115 and the de-
sire to maintain good relations with the community116—may not 
always be present. As Garnett admits, “[her] case study does 
not, and cannot, demonstrate how the precondemnation bargain-
ing process works in every case.”117 One can find at least one ex-
ample in which the initial compensation dynamics went in the 
opposite direction, and it occurred in what is arguably the most 
famous eminent domain case—Kelo. The developer in that case 
initially offered Susette Kelo, the named plaintiff, an amount 
less than the fair market value of her house, with the agent 
warning that the developer would take the house using eminent 
domain if Kelo did not accept the offer.118 Similarly, in one of the 
more recent studies comparing compensation levels to the fair 
market value, Professor Yun-chien Chang found that the median 
compensation for residential properties was 88 percent of the es-
timated fair market value,119 implying that overcompensation is 
not necessarily more likely than undercompensation. There may 
be reasons to be particularly concerned about homeowners with 
little bargaining power: as Garnett herself admits, “[o]wners 
 
 113 Id at 120–21 (discussing how, with the same expressway, the rerouting was at 
the expense of those with less power and concluding that “[t]his troubling history serves 
as a reminder that, while Taker-avoidance may minimize the overall undercompensation 
problem, the risk of undercompensation persists in individual cases, especially when the 
would-be targets lack political clout”). 
 114 Id at 130–36. 
 115 See Garnett, 105 Mich L Rev at 131 (cited in note 111). 
 116 See id at 131–32. 
 117 Id at 135. 
 118 See Jeff Benedict, Little Pink House: A True Story of Defiance and Courage 67 
(Grand Central 2009). Kelo had estimated the fair market value of her house to be at 
least $70,000, stating at one point: “How many people with a $70,000 house have a view 
like this?” But she was initially offered only $68,000. Id at 131. While she ultimately re-
ceived $442,000 for her lot after the Supreme Court’s decision, this high amount was due 
to the desire of Connecticut officials to settle quickly and avoid further publicity. See id 
at 373–74; Somin, The Grasping Hand at 233 (cited in note 56). 
 119 Yun-chien Chang, Private Property and Takings Compensation: Theoretical 
Framework and Empirical Analysis 111–12, 130 (Edward Elgar 2013). 
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have little incentive to ask for more than market value if they 
realize that they will not get it.”120 Moreover, in the case that 
Garnett discusses, the higher compensation was part of a larger 
plan to cover relocation expenses, rather than having home-
owners individually bargain for such coverage in the first 
place.121 Thus, while these dynamics show that some factors can 
lessen the degree of undercompensation, they will not apply in 
all cases, and the resulting disparate impact may be particularly 
disturbing. 
Even if the percentage of cases in which undercompensation 
occurs is low, the problems arising from undercompensation are 
exacerbated by the increased use of eminent domain for non-
traditional public purposes. Epstein has written extensively 
about this problem. His concerns focus on narrow interests be-
coming richer through takings at the expense of a few landown-
ers, which is why he has emphasized the importance of dispers-
ing the benefits of takings.122 As discussed above,123 one can 
conceive of an eminent domain action as imposing an externality 
arising from the fact that the taker does not fully internalize 
eminent domain’s cost to the owner. Limits on the extent to 
which the benefits of such projects are concentrated can help re-
duce the externality problem by minimizing the difference be-
tween the benefits and the actual costs. Indeed, this tension be-
tween undercompensation and a broader definition of public use 
may be behind the strong public reaction against Kelo, as men-
tioned in the Introduction. Identifying one of the main issues in 
the oral arguments, Justice Breyer pushed against the govern-
ment respondents, pointing out that the takees “want[ed] to be 
really not made a lot worse off, at least not made a lot worse off 
just so some other people [could] get a lot more money”;124 and 
Justice Anthony Kennedy also showed an interest in this idea.125 
 
 120 Garnett, 105 Mich L Rev at 127–28 (cited in note 111). 
 121 Id at 132 (noting that the company chose to cover relocation costs out of a desire 
for expediency, even though it did not believe that it was legally bound to do so). 
 122 Epstein, Takings at 115, 163–64 (cited in note 10). 
 123 See note 103 and accompanying text. 
 124 Kelo Transcript at *50 (cited in note 21). 
 125 See id at *22 (“Are there any writings or scholarship that indicates that when 
you have property being taken from one private person ultimately to go to another pri-
vate person, that what we ought to do is to adjust the measure of compensation, so that 
the owner—the condemnee—can receive some sort of a premium for the development?”). 
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Owners may feel the injustices of the fair market value standard 
when their losses are other citizens’ gains.126 
B. Difficulties in Attaining Honest Subjective Valuations 
While there are potential inefficiencies and injustices that 
result from the payment of only the fair market value of taken 
property, the main issue, as alluded to in several court decisions, 
is that arriving at the subjective valuation is difficult. This is 
because an owner has an incentive to lie when asked directly 
about how much she values a particular piece of property, and 
devising clever mechanisms to avoid this problem requires mak-
ing unrealistic assumptions. 
The problem of lying in this context is so intuitive that 
scholars who discuss it rarely cite articles to support the 
claim.127 Because an individual can always claim that her subjec-
tive value of a possession is arbitrarily high and can assert arbi-
trary preferences, she could employ a holdout strategy under the 
guise of claiming a high subjective valuation.128 
Economists have attempted to develop sophisticated mecha-
nisms to incentivize individuals to reveal their subjective valua-
tions, but the assumptions required for these mechanisms to 
work are unrealistic. A creative method of incentivizing individ-
uals to reveal their subjective valuations has been developed by 
Professors Florenz Plassmann and T. Nicolaus Tideman, who 
have argued that all homeowners would provide honest esti-
mates of subjective valuations if governments tied property tax-
es to subjective valuations and if the probability of a loss from a 
 
 126 For example, the Director of the NAACP’s Washington Bureau, Hilary Shelton, 
emphasized how “just compensation” was a “misnomer.” In his congressional testimony 
about the Kelo decision, he argued that “[t]he fact that a particular property is identified 
and designated for economic development [ ] certainly means that the market is current-
ly undervaluing that property or that the property has some trapped value that the 
market is not yet recognizing.” In addition, when he was asked whether “adequate com-
pensation” would address some of the disparate impacts of eminent domain on poor 
communities, he replied that “[i]t would begin the process.” The Kelo Decision: Investi-
gating Takings of Homes and Other Private Property; Hearing before the Committee on 
the Judiciary, United States Senate, 109th Cong, 1st Sess 12, 13, 19 (2005) (statement of 
Hilary O. Shelton, Director, Washington Bureau, National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People, Washington, DC). 
 127 See, for example, Miceli, The Economic Theory of Eminent Domain at 59 (cited in 
note 14) (discussing the “obvious question of why landowners cannot simply be asked 
how much they value the land and then be paid that amount in compensation,” and ar-
guing that “[t]he problem with this approach, of course, is that landowners would have 
an incentive to misrepresent their valuations”). 
 128 See id. 
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taking were equal to the valuation tax rate.129 The problem with 
this approach is that there is no reason to expect that the tax rate 
will be equal to the probability of a taking,130 especially because 
this probability is likely to vary across the different types of prop-
erties eligible for takings.131 While Plassmann and Tideman do 
not provide estimates, the probability of a loss from a taking is 
so low that it is considered to be “near zero”132 over the entire 
time that an individual owns a property. By contrast, most 
American individuals can expect to pay between 0.5 and 1 per-
cent of their properties’ value as property taxes on an annual 
basis alone.133 Thus, the percentage expected to be paid in prop-
erty taxes over the time the property is owned is not also “near 
zero,” and the assumptions required by Plassmann and Tideman 
do not hold. 
There also is a behavioral-economics critique of subjective 
valuation in the context of eminent domain takings that pro-
vides reason to be cautious about subjective valuation, even if 
homeowners were being honest in reporting it. To the extent 
that the subjective value of a home includes not having to move, 
people overestimate the harm they will feel from an injury.134 
This is related to the behavioral-economics finding that individ-
uals may not do a good job of valuating nonmarket goods. For 
example, in the context of assessing the consequences of health 
changes, individuals focus more on what it is like to become un-
healthy rather than to be unhealthy, resulting in “errors when 
estimating the sum that they feel will adequately compensate 
them.”135 Another behavioral-economics concern with providing 
 
 129 Florenz Plassmann and T. Nicolaus Tideman, Accurate Valuation in the Absence 
of Markets, 36 Pub Fin Rev 334, 345–46 (2008). 
 130 See Miceli, The Economic Theory of Eminent Domain at 65 (cited in note 14). 
 131 One potential source for such variation is the fact that residences of owners with 
more political power are less likely to be subject to eminent domain. See note 113 and 
accompanying text. 
 132 Thomas J. Miceli and Kathleen Segerson, Takings, in Boudewijn Bouckaert and 
Gerrit De Geest, eds, 4 Encyclopedia of Law and Economics: The Economics of Public 
and Tax Law 328, 334–35 (Edward Elgar 2000) (finding that “the probability of a physi-
cal taking is probably near zero for most landowners,” as “physical” contrasts with the 
more probable but intangible taking by restrictions on use through zoning or environ-
mental regulation). 
 133 Benjamin H. Harris and Brian David Moore, Residential Property Taxes in the 
United States *2 (Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center, Nov 18, 2013), archived at 
http://perma.cc/FZJ5-KTHH. 
 134 See John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan S. Masur, Hedonic 
Adaptation and the Settlement of Civil Lawsuits, 108 Colum L Rev 1516, 1534–35 (2008). 
 135 Id at 1535. 
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compensation for an individual’s estimate of her own subjective 
value is that the deviation between the fair market value and 
the indemnity value may be a consequence of an endowment ef-
fect. An endowment effect occurs when someone perceives the 
cost of losing a good she already owns (that is, the individual’s 
“willingness to accept” for the good) to be larger than the bene-
fits of gaining the same good assuming she did not own it (that 
is, the individual’s “willingness to pay” for the good).136 
Because of these two behavioral distortions, the proposal of-
fered by Professors Jack Knetsch and Thomas Borcherding to 
estimate subjective value based on owner characteristics is prob-
lematic. Knetsch and Borcherding propose making “a series of 
apparently sincere bids” to determine owners’ reservation prices 
for their properties.137 These reservation prices are then modeled 
empirically to be a function of observable individual characteris-
tics, and that function can be used to estimate subjective value 
in future eminent domain cases given the owners’ characteris-
tics.138 However, when cognitive biases cause harms to be overes-
timated, an allocatively efficient taking might not occur because 
the owner’s estimated (expected) subjective valuation is higher 
than the actual (expected) subjective value, the individual de-
mands too much, and thus a higher-value taker does not engage 
in eminent domain. 
With the standard overestimation arising from a focus on 
the change rather than on the final state, this bidding approach 
will generate welfare losses, as this sort of overestimation in-
volves estimating a value that the owner would later regret.139 
The efficiency implications of endowment effects in the valua-
tions generated by Knetsch and Borcherding’s proposal, howev-
er, are more complicated. One could argue that the presence of 
an endowment effect does not create welfare problems, since al-
locative efficiency requires that goods be allocated to an individ-
ual whose willingness to accept exceeds all others’ willingness to 
 
 136 See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Ap-
proach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan L Rev 1471, 1483–84 (1998). 
 137 Knetsch and Borcherding, 29 U Toronto L J at 247 (cited in note 49). 
 138 Id. 
 139 For example, this method would lead to estimates of the required just compensa-
tion that would be too high; properties that the individual (in retrospect) would wish had 
been taken would, in fact, not be taken, as a result of the heightened compensation re-
quirement and the owner’s biases in the negotiation process. 
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pay, regardless of the existence of endowment effects.140 Thus, a 
subjective valuation that includes an endowment effect is still 
the correct standard for the amount that a taker’s value should 
exceed. However, as Professor Russell Korobkin argues, this 
standard is only sometimes appropriate. When the gap is caused 
by resource constraints—which is to say, “differences in ability 
to back up preferences with dollars that result from different 
levels of wealth”—the estimate that includes the endowment ef-
fect (the higher willingness to accept) is proper for determining 
whether the good has been allocated to the highest-value user.141 
But when the endowment effect is due to wealth effects, it is not 
obvious that this is correct;142 when the endowment effect is due 
to “regret-avoidance behavior or the disutility caused by selling,” 
the lower willingness-to-pay standard is the correct one for wel-
fare analyses.143 Thus, the presence of endowment effects in 
Knetsch and Borcherding’s estimates could generate efficiency 
losses if certain potential sources of the endowment effect cause 
the gap, as the endowment effect could prevent efficient eminent 
domain takings from occurring due to regret avoidance or to the 
disutility of selling. 
In the academic context, Judge Posner has raised another 
problem with subjective valuations for takings—one that, in 
theory, would persist even if an accurate estimation of these 
valuations were possible. Posner argues that taking subjective 
value into account can incentivize overinvestment in property so 
that the owner can make money due to the subjective valuation 
exceeding the fair market value.144 Although he makes the com-
ment in passing, Posner seems concerned that owners who fore-
see the possibility of a taking will purchase property that they 
would not otherwise have purchased but for supra–fair market 
value compensation to earn the premium between their subjec-
tive valuations and what they actually paid. However, it is not 
clear that there is an inefficiency here: the individual purchases 
 
 140 For this argument, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Legal Policy and the Endowment 
Effect, 20 J Legal Stud 225, 226–29 (1991). 
 141 Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw U L Rev 
1227, 1249, 1257 (2003). 
 142 See id at 1248, 1257–59 (illustrating that all the other types of factors driving an 
endowment effect that the author mentions are covered under the categories in which 
willingness to accept or willingness to pay is clearly relevant). 
 143 Id at 1258. 
 144 Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 64–65 (cited in note 104) (arguing that the 
law’s attempt to address this concern by prohibiting compensation for property en-
hancements made after the announcement of government projects is insufficient). 
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goods that she values at an amount that is higher than the pur-
chase price. Thus, an inefficiency will occur only if an individual 
is able to lie about her subjective valuation. 
Perhaps Posner is concerned that strategic purchasing takes 
resources away from goods that provide more utility but that are 
less likely to be the target of eminent domain actions. However, 
this will be a problem only if the probability of a taking is very 
high, as the expected profits (the difference between the amount 
paid and the subjective value, multiplied by the probability of 
being subject to eminent domain) go down when eminent do-
main is unlikely. Therefore, as the probability of takings de-
creases, these expected profits decrease—perhaps failing to jus-
tify the transaction costs of purchasing—and the probability of 
being stuck with a property that was not as good as the alterna-
tive rises. Thus, the low probability of the use of eminent do-
main discussed earlier145 makes the harms that Posner identifies 
likely to be small. As a result, a well-being-analysis approach 
that provides a good measure of subjective valuation need not 
address this particular concern.146 
C. Well-Being Analysis as a Solution to the Problems Inherent 
in Subjective Valuation 
A well-being analysis attempts to trace an indifference curve 
between different states of the world and income levels, allowing 
us to infer what level of income would make an individual just as 
well off as if an event did not occur.147 This is done by asking re-
spondents “only simple questions rating their current level of 
happiness,” which, as opposed to some of the questions outlined 
in Part II.B, “do not require them to value nonmarket goods.”148 
The individual reports of happiness levels are compared to the 
different events that those individuals are experiencing and, ide-
ally, the reports follow a set of individuals to control for individu-
al “fixed effects” for happiness—that is, an individual’s average 
measured happiness level.149 Given the potential for cognitive 
 
 145 See note 132 and accompanying text. 
 146 For further criticisms of the overinvestment concern, see Chang, Private Property 
and Takings Compensation at 28–29 (cited in note 119) (pointing to risk aversion as one 
reason that individuals may choose not to overinvest). 
 147 See Oswald and Powdthavee, 37 J Legal Stud at S220 (cited in note 27). 
 148 John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan S. Masur, Happiness 
and the Law 88 (Chicago 2015) (“[T]he techniques used by [well-being analysis] avoid a 
number of [ ] methodological problems.”). 
 149 Formally, this is done using the following regression specification: 
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biases, this approach is especially useful when there are no 
“price tags attached” to the valuable item in question,150 as is the 
case for the subjective valuation of a home. 
The success of a well-being analysis in the context of estab-
lishing the subjective value of a property is a function of the da-
ta set available. The ideal data set would be a sample that in-
volved individuals who were subject to eminent domain, were 
forced to move, and were paid only the fair market value of their 
properties; it would also include a control group that was not 
subject to eminent domain. All individuals would be followed for 
a few years after the act of eminent domain occurred, and they 
would be asked questions about their levels of well-being.151 By 
looking at the effects of being exogenously treated as the target 
of eminent domain actions (that is, of being randomly chosen to 
have their properties taken) on the happiness levels of the 
takees, the well-being analysis would show exactly how much, 
on average, individuals would need to be paid on top of the fair 
market value to be left indifferent about having their property 
taken and being forced to move. This value would include com-
pensation for moving costs as well as the subjective-value pre-
mium of the homes. These costs can be encapsulated in how 
much less happy individuals are if they move and are not com-
pensated for that move plus their subjective-value premium, 
compared to the control individuals who were not subject to em-
inent domain. 
Even with less ideal data sets in which the individuals were 
not subject to forced moves, the well-being effects of moving can 
be estimated by looking at the effects on happiness of selling and 
moving away from a property that one owned, controlling for the 
 
ܮ ௜ܵ,௧ ൌ ߙଵ ൅ ߙଶܦ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߙଷܦ௜,௧ିଶ ൅ ߙସܦ௜,௧ିଷ ൅ ௜ܺ,௧ᇱ ߛ ൅ ߚሺݕ௜ሻ ൅ ߠ௜.  
In this equation, ܦ௜,௧  captures whether a bad life event happened in period ݐ, ߛ is the in-
dividual’s characteristics, ݕ௜ is the level of income of individual ݅, and ߠ௜ is a fixed effect 
for individual ݅. The sum of ߙଶ ൅ ߙଷ ൅ ߙସ is the calculated impact of the bad life event on 
life-satisfaction measures (ܮ ௜ܵ,௧). Thus, because ߚ translates between life-satisfaction lev-
els and income, the damages amount would be ݏ ൌ ሺߙଶ ൅ ߙଷ ൅ ߙସሻ/ߚ. 
 150 Oswald and Powdthavee, 37 J Legal Stud at S218 (cited in note 27). See also 
generally John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan S. Masur, Well-Being 
Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 Duke L J 1603 (2013) (arguing for the validity of a 
well-being-analysis approach as opposed to a cost-benefit approach in evaluating particu-
lar policies, and pointing to the virtue of a well-being-analysis approach in cases in 
which opportunities to quantify revealed preferences are limited). 
 151 Note that there are many alternative measurements of well-being. For an over-
view of the most common alternatives, see Ed Diener, et al, Well-Being for Public Policy 
11–19 (Oxford 2009). 
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fact that the individual chose to move in the first place. This 
Comment follows that approach in attempting to control for the 
effects of the act of moving (from either owned or rented resi-
dences) on happiness, using the BHPS data. This approach is 
necessary because the reasons the individual chose to move 
could be related to happiness, and thus any estimation of the ef-
fect of giving up one’s home for only fair market value could be 
skewed by the same happiness-influencing life events that pro-
voked the decision to relocate in the first place. For example, one 
could move because one receives a job that one likes better but 
that does not pay more (an improvement in quality of life that 
would be unobserved in the data), and thus the observed effect 
on happiness of the move might be positive. However, the effect 
of giving up one’s house for only its fair market value might still 
be negative, even though the net effect of the move is positive. 
Thus, simply looking at the effect on happiness of moving from a 
house that one owns is likely to be biased. 
This approach measures different effects than would be ex-
pected with a data set surveying takees (since moving is con-
trolled for, the impact of moving on happiness is not estimated). 
With a survey of takees, there is no need to control for the deci-
sion to move, because the decision was not chosen by the indi-
viduals and thus there is no reason to believe that this decision 
is correlated with unobserved life events separate from moving 
that affect happiness. Thus, the data from takees would encap-
sulate the cost of being subject to eminent domain and being 
paid only fair market value compensation. However, because 
with the BHPS data it is necessary to control for the choice to 
move in order to attempt to estimate the effects of the different 
motivations for moving, the effect on happiness of having to up-
root is left out of the estimate. To improve the data, the estimate 
could be supplemented with tax data on the costs of moving in 
order to arrive at a similar estimate. These data are easily ac-
cessible, because individuals report their costs of moving to the 
federal government in order to get tax deductions for those 
moves.152 By incorporating the financial cost of moving based on 
tax data, the well-being results from survey data involving indi-
viduals who were not the targets of eminent domain can still be 
helpful in establishing what takees would need to be paid in or-
der to be “made whole.” 
 
 152 See 26 USC § 217. 
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Such an approach would address some of the problems dis-
cussed above in establishing subjective value. First, there would 
be no incentive for individuals to lie. In the ideal study, an indi-
vidual would already have been compensated for the taking of 
her property, and thus she would have no reason to believe that 
the answers she gave about her happiness levels would influence 
her compensation. Moreover, results from a well-being analysis 
would not be sensitive to the estimation problems mentioned 
above.153 The fact that individuals adapt to new conditions better 
than expected would be captured in the well-being levels that 
are reported. Further, the owner would never have to estimate her 
subjective valuation of her house (which prevents inflation due to 
endowment effects caused by estimation distortions), but she would 
still have to recognize any disutility of selling that is part of an en-
dowment effect and that should be counted.154 Thus, such an ap-
proach is likely to provide a better estimate of subjective value 
than the best honest guess an individual could provide ex ante.155 
In addition, to the extent that one can reasonably expect 
adaptation,156 a well-being analysis helps capture variation in 
the way that individuals adapt.157 Well-being analysis provides 
data about who is most likely to adapt to losing their homes un-
der eminent domain. As a result, using the results of such an 
analysis to determine compensation for eminent domain takings 
can help make eminent domain more efficient in the Kaldor-
Hicks sense (that is, in a way that maximizes total welfare and 
could leave all individuals as well or better off with adequate 
lump-sum transfers).158 With a sufficiently large data set, this 
analysis could provide support for laws like the Missouri law 
mentioned above, in which the “heritage value” premium for 
 
 153 See Part II.B. 
 154 See notes 141–43 and accompanying text. 
 155 See Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur, 62 Duke L J at 1620 (cited in note 150) 
(discussing how quickly an individual’s happiness returns to pre-accident levels after 
losing a limb, and suggesting that “[s]tudies of people who have lost limbs provide fairly 
accurate information on the hedonic loss associated with losing an arm”). 
 156 This is not something that should be taken for granted, as well-being analyses 
show that adaptability varies significantly across different types of events. See Diener, et 
al, Well-Being for Public Policy at 106 (cited in note 151) (contrasting the adaptability to 
marriage with the adaptability to widowhood).  
 157 See id (finding that in well-being analyses about adaptability to life events, “a 
pattern that emerged in all the analyses [ ] conducted was that adaptation effects varied 
considerably among the individuals that [were] examined”).  
 158 See Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Com-
parisons of Utility, 49 Econ J 549, 550–52 (1939); J.R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare 
Economics, 49 Econ J 696, 711–12 (1939). 
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taking a property from someone who has lived there for an unu-
sually long period makes the taking more expensive for the tak-
er.159 A well-being-analysis approach would help establish 
whether the wedge between the fair market value and the sub-
jective value is larger for individuals who have stayed in their 
homes for longer. If so, then this approach could establish a ba-
sis for more states to implement laws like Missouri’s or for 
courts to apply a variable multiplier. Potential takers would 
then internalize the losses that they imposed on individuals who 
have stayed in their homes for a long time, and they would thus 
accomplish the public goals in a cheaper way by seeking out in-
dividuals for whom moving is less costly. 
A well-being-analysis approach responds to the pragmatic 
compromise seen in the federal constitutional cases, because 
well-being analyses can be highly reliable if done rigorously and 
with large samples.160 There is likely to be some measurement er-
ror, but because this error is in the dependent variable, the effect 
in the regression process is on the error terms rather than on the 
regression coefficients themselves, and the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression still works in large samples as long as that error 
is not correlated with explanatory variables.161 The large sample 
size can help compensate for any problems in reliability within 
individual-level data providing measures of well-being.162 
Although one’s initial reaction might be to suppose that emo-
tions are not part of law, “nothing in conventional welfare eco-
nomics implies that preferences in an emotion state should be 
discounted.”163 Other critics, especially mainstream economists, 
object to a well-being-analysis approach from a consistency 
standpoint, worrying about the “interpersonal comparability of 
 
 159 See note 62 and accompanying text.  
 160 See Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur, 62 Duke L J at 1624 (cited in note 150) 
(“Meta-analyses of different well-being tools have found high levels of reliability for both 
life satisfaction and experience sampling methods.”). 
 161 See Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Da-
ta 76–78 (MIT 2d ed 2010) (demonstrating that in the case of random measurement error 
in the dependent variable, “the larger error variance violates none of the assumptions 
needed for OLS estimation to have its desirable large-sample properties,” and stating 
that when “the measurement error is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, OLS 
is perfectly appropriate”). 
 162 See Diener, et al, Well-Being for Public Policy at 69–70 (cited in note 151) (dis-
cussing how “large sample sizes compensate for low reliability” in large-scale surveys). 
 163 Eric A. Posner, Law and the Emotions *28 (John M. Olin Law & Economics 
Working Paper Series), archived at http://perma.cc/27UF-CZB9.  
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well-being.”164 But a well-being-analysis approach fits in well with 
accepted assumptions of psychology, sociology, and health eco-
nomics.165 Even the well-respected traditional neoclassical econo-
mist Professor Gary Becker admitted the relevance of well-being 
analyses to economic questions.166 Moreover, emotional effects 
play an important role in intentional tort law, as damages are al-
lowed for the intentional infliction of emotional distress;167 thus, 
eminent domain’s similarity to an intentional tort as a deliberate 
action makes particularly relevant the emotional component of 
the subjective value that a well-being analysis may capture. 
Some scholars might argue that a well-being analysis, as es-
timated by looking at movers’ subjective valuations, does not go 
far enough. Fennell has argued that subjective value is just one 
part of the undercompensation that occurs in the context of emi-
nent domain: 
The uncompensated increment is made up of three distinct 
components: (1) the increment by which the property own-
er’s subjective value exceeds fair market value; (2) the 
chance of reaping a surplus from trade (that is, of obtaining 
an amount larger than one’s own true subjective valuation); 
and (3) the autonomy of choosing for oneself when to sell.168 
A well-being analysis of movers would capture only the first 
of these components, and a well-being analysis of individuals 
who were actually displaced by eminent domain projects would 
capture only the happiness costs of losing the first and the last 
components. However, it is not clear that the second component 
fits in with the make-whole standard that the Court requires:169 
in breaking a contract, there is no obligation to share some of 
 
 164 Bernard M.S. van Praag and Barbara E. Baarsma, Using Happiness Surveys to 
Value Intangibles: The Case of Airport Noise, 115 Econ J 224, 236 (2005). 
 165 See id. 
 166 Luis Rayo and Gary S. Becker, Evolutionary Efficiency and Happiness, 115 J Polit 
Econ 302, 327–28 (2007) (modeling “happiness as a biological measurement instrument 
that guides the agent’s decisions,” and concluding that “when viewed from an economic 
perspective, happiness appears to have multiple signs of statistical inference”). 
 167 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965). 
 168 Fennell, 2004 Mich St L Rev at 958–59 (cited in note 38) (citations omitted). See 
also Wyman, 41 UC Davis L Rev at 260 (cited in note 23) (discussing how eminent do-
main deprives takees of opportunities to bargain for shares of surplus from economic-
development projects). 
 169 See Part I.A. 
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the surplus once the breached-against party is made just as well 
off as if the breach did not occur.170 
While some will argue that a well-being-analysis approach 
applied to eminent domain takings does not go far enough, it at 
least provides a rigorous way to estimate the subjective-value 
premium that can exist for many reasons. In doing so, it workably 
achieves an estimate that other methods have failed to reliably 
yield. It makes progress on preventing some of the inefficiencies 
associated with undercompensation, and it addresses concerns 
about the justice of the fair market value compromise. The next 
Part provides an example of what this helpful analysis might 
look like in practice. 
III.  AN ESTIMATE OF THE WELL-BEING-ANALYSIS MULTIPLIER 
FOR JUST COMPENSATION 
This Part provides an example of how a well-being analysis—
based on a longitudinal study following residents of Great 
Britain—can establish a basis for providing supra–fair market 
value compensation in eminent domain cases. Using a well-
being-analysis approach, this Part shows that moving from a 
home that one owned in the previous three years correlates with 
a statistically significant decline in well-being. The data also 
show that this negative effect is higher for groups of individuals 
whom one would expect to have higher subjective property valu-
ations. Part III.A summarizes the data and explains why they 
are well-suited for a well-being analysis, and Part III.B de-
scribes the methodology and the assumptions behind such an 
analysis in this context. The estimated negative cost of giving up 
a property that one owns for only the fair market value is dis-
cussed in Part III.C, and the implications of such a significant 
estimate are discussed in Part III.D. 
A. Summary of the Data 
The ideal data for a thorough well-being analysis are survey 
data that include measures of overall well-being and that follow 
 
 170 See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 131 (cited in note 104), citing Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv L Rev 457, 462 (1897) (“[I]t is not the pol-
icy of the law to compel adherence to contracts but only to require each party to choose 
between performing in accordance with the contract and compensating the other party 
for any injury resulting from a failure to perform.”). See also Holmes, 10 Harv L Rev at 
462 (cited in note 170) (“The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction 
that you must pay damages if you do not keep it—and nothing else.”). 
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a group of individuals for multiple time periods; the BHPS data 
set that this Part uses is one of the best examples of such a data 
set.171 Paid for by the British government, this survey has been 
conducted annually since 1991 with substantial efforts made to 
follow up with previous respondents.172 Respondents are inter-
viewed in successive waves: when an entire household moves, 
the household members are followed to their new residence; 
when an individual moves from the original household, the adult 
members of her new household are also interviewed. The BHPS 
data set provides a “nationally representative sample of house-
holds,”173 and it surveys over forty thousand individuals above 
the age of fifteen.174 Because the individuals who are compen-
sated in eminent domain cases are owners,175 the sample used in 
this Comment is restricted to individuals who are currently 
listed as primary homeowners or primary renters, as the house-
hold survey identifies up to two individuals in each category.176 
The subset of individuals interviewed in the BHPS data set were 
interviewed later with similar questions in the Understanding 
Society data set177 in waves B through E, and these four waves 
are also included in the regression analyses. 
 
 171 The attractiveness of this data set for well-being analyses is reflected in the variety 
of articles using it to value factors that are not subject to market pricing. See, for example, 
Oswald and Powdthavee, 37 J Legal Stud at S220 (cited in note 27) (using the BHPS data 
set for “regression equations in which a measure of happiness is the dependent variable” to 
“sketch an alternative . . . in the setting of emotional damages”); R. Layard, S. Nickell, and 
G. Mayraz, The Marginal Utility of Income, 92 J Pub Econ 1846, 1847, 1856 (2008) (us-
ing a “measurement of experienced happiness in six major surveys,” including the BHPS, 
to estimate “the elasticity [ ] of the marginal utility of income with respect to the level of 
income”). 
 172 British Household Panel Survey, Waves 1-18, 1991-2009: Secure Access, National 
Grid Reference (Easting, Northing, OSGRDIND) (UK Data Service, Jan 16, 2014), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/9RHK-9ZZ2. 
 173 Oswald and Powdthavee, 37 J Legal Stud at S224 (cited in note 27). 
 174 This number is calculated by counting unique identifiers in the pid variable that 
occur in any wave. The subset that occurs in multiple waves and provides complete sur-
vey responses is much smaller, as is reflected in the number of observations in Table 3. 
See British Household Panel Survey: Waves 1-18, 1991-2009 (UK Data Service, 2010) 
(“BHPS Data”), online at http://discover.ukdataservice.ac.uk/catalogue/?sn=5151 (visited 
Apr 5, 2016) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 175 See Kelo, 545 US at 496. 
 176 For example, consider the variables AHSOWR1 and ARENTP1. See BHPS Doc-
umentation and Questionnaires (University of Essex Institute for Social and Economic 
Research), archived at http://perma.cc/2MPQ-VYD7. 
 177 Individuals in the BHPS data set can be linked to those in the Understanding 
Society data using the variable pidp, which has the corresponding identification in the 
BHPS data set for all individuals who were surveyed in both. See Understanding Society: 
Waves 1-5, 2009-2014 (UK Data Service, Nov 19, 2015) (“Understanding Society Data”), 
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This data set is useful for this Comment because survey re-
spondents were asked about their life-satisfaction178 levels in the 
majority of the waves. In addition to these indicators of happi-
ness levels, the data include information about whether the in-
dividual moved from a home that someone in the household 
owned (each year, this describes around 5 percent of the sample), 
the distance that the individual moved, and the individual’s pref-
erences with respect to moving in the previous years. The data set 
also allows for nearly all the controls used by Professors Oswald 
and Powdthavee in their aforementioned works;179 Oswald and 
Powdthavee have pioneered the use of this data set for legal 
valuation issues by estimating the effects of a death in the fami-
ly or of a disability on happiness for the calculation of damag-
es.180 In addition, the data set has information about whether 
the individual wished to stay in a particular location, her rea-
sons for moving, and her tenure at the home she owned. The last 
variable in particular allows a well-being analysis to determine 
whether the costs of giving up one’s home increase the longer 
one has been there. 
While this study is helpful for deriving a lower bound for the 
cost of displacement from an owned property on life-satisfaction 
measures (that is, the actual value is likely higher), it is not the 
ideal data set for a well-being-analysis estimate of subjective 
valuation. One problem with the data is that they mostly involve 
people who made the choice to move rather than people who 
were forced by the government to sell their properties.181 This is 
because people who move typically choose to move, and thus 
there may be a selection effect due to these individuals’ relative-
ly lower costs of moving (that is, the individuals who move have, 
on average, lower costs and lower subjective valuations than 
 
online at http://discover.ukdataservice.ac.uk/catalogue/?sn=6614 (visited Apr 9, 2016) 
(Perma archive unavailable). 
 178 In the data, this variable is wLFSATO, where w denotes the wave letter, which 
is the round of surveying and represents a year range during which individuals were 
surveyed. This variable is available for all survey years since 1997, except for 2002. The 
surveyor asks the respondent to reply, on a scale of 1–7, to the question: “Using the same 
scale how dissatisfied or satisfied are you with your life overall?” Living in Britain - 
Wave 6 Coversheet *7 (UK Data Service) (“Wave 6 Questionnaire”), archived at 
http://perma.cc/M4YB-MH6K ) (emphasis omitted). 
 179 See notes 76–81 and accompanying text. 
 180 See Part I.C. 
 181 While it is possible that some of the individuals in the data set moved due to em-
inent domain actions on the part of the British government, there is no way to identify 
such individuals given the questions that were asked. 
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those who stay).182 However, this implies that the result is a low-
er bound on the hedonic cost of moving, since one would expect 
an individual targeted by a taking to have a higher cost of mov-
ing or a higher subjective value than a seller, due to the selec-
tion effects of choosing to sell and what this choice signals about 
the extent to which an owner is sentimental about her residence. 
Another difficulty in using this data set is that it generates 
an estimate for the costs of moving on the well-being of British 
residents rather than of American residents. Thus, this data set 
is helpful only if it is reasonable to expect that the effects on 
happiness of being paid only fair market value are similar in 
both countries. The first question that this raises is whether one 
would expect estimates across countries based on happiness re-
gressions to be similar in general. Professors John Bronsteen, 
Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan Masur acknowledge the 
difficulties of using well-being survey results from other coun-
tries, but they believe the data are still comparable enough to be 
relevant.183 For example, studies have shown that, across coun-
tries, the effect of income on happiness is consistent,184 which 
implies some similarities in the sources of happiness across coun-
tries and counsels in favor of accepting the conversion between 
happiness and dollars that the well-being analysis does based on 
British data, and in favor of applying it in the American context. 
Moreover, an article that focused on reported levels of happiness 
in Great Britain and the United States found that “data from 
 
 182 See Fennell, 113 Colum L Rev Sidebar at 112 (cited in note 95) (“[D]ramatic 
downward shifts [in subjective valuation] may occur due to changes in employment, 
household configuration, health, and other factors. People who have experienced these 
downward shifts are likely to be overrepresented among sellers, along with those who 
never formed strong attachments to the home in the first place.”) (citation omitted). 
 183 Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur, 62 Duke L J at 1626 n 110 (cited in note 150) 
(arguing that “[e]mpirical studies have found [ ] that similarly situated individuals in 
different countries have similar levels of life satisfaction . . . [which] suggests that sub-
jective well-being measures may even be comparable across countries”).  
 184 See Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers, Economic Growth and Subjective Well-
Being: Reassessing the Easterlin Paradox *9 (NBER Working Paper Series, Aug 2008), 
archived at http://perma.cc/R9GA-SQPQ (arguing that Gallup World Poll data “yield a 
particularly close relationship between subjective well-being and the log of GDP per cap-
ita,” as “the correlation exceeds 0.8” for the 131 countries with “usable” GDP estimates); 
Diener, et al, Well-Being for Public Policy at 198 (cited in note 151) (“The high degree of 
cross-country correlation between average incomes and life satisfaction has convinced 
some previous skeptics to take life satisfaction data more seriously as genuine measures 
of well-being.”). 
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Great Britain give noticeably similar results” to what was found 
in the American context.185 
The second question is whether it is reasonable to expect 
British and American citizens to have similar attitudes about 
property that would affect their subjective valuations. It is 
worth noting that the United Kingdom and the United States 
received nearly identical scores in a Property Rights Index con-
structed by the Property Rights Alliance,186 and the similar re-
spect for property provides some evidence for a similar attach-
ment. Although scholars have not yet produced studies that show 
that British and American residents value homeownership iden-
tically, the homeownership rates across the countries are re-
markably similar.187 Finally, one weak indicator that Americans 
may value homeownership more than the British and thus have 
a higher subjective valuation than the British is the fact that 
the percentage of British renters who wish to own is lower than 
the percentage of American renters who wish to own.188 Renters 
often eventually do become homeowners; given that the two 
countries have similar rates of homeownership—and assuming 
that this attitude was held by renters in the past—this provides 
some evidence that the British may attach less value to their 
homes. As such, the estimate would be similar or might be a 
lower bound. 
 
 185 David G. Blanchflower and Andrew J. Oswald, Well-Being over Time in Britain 
and the USA, 88 J Pub Econ 1359, 1367 (2004). 
 186 The International Property Rights Index 2014 (Property Rights Alliance, 2014), 
archived at http://perma.cc/C56V-KPW7 (assigning the United Kingdom a score of 7.8 
and the United States a score of 7.7). Because no other country had the exact same score 
as the United States, this means that no country was closer to the United States than 
the United Kingdom was in terms of the protection of property rights. 
 187 See Drew DeSilver, Around the World, Governments Promote Home Ownership 
(Pew Research Center, Aug 6, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/2TKK-ZD8C (showing 
that in 2011, 65.0 percent and 67.9 percent of US and UK adults, respectively, were 
homeowners); Dan Andrews and Aida Caldera Sánchez, The Evolution of Homeowner-
ship Rates in Selected OECD Countries: Demographic and Public Policy Influences, 2011 
OECD J: Econ Stud 207, 212 (showing that in the 1990s, 66.2 percent and 67.5 percent of 
US and UK adults, respectively, were homeowners, and that in 2004, 68.69 percent and 
70.70 percent of US and UK adults, respectively, were homeowners). 
 188 While results from the British Social Attitudes Survey show that 45 to 46 per-
cent of renters would rather own, 84 percent of Americans intend to buy. Compare Alison 
Wallace, Public Attitudes to Housing *9 (University of York, Sept 2010), archived at 
http://perma.cc/38DV-9M2C, with Study Finds 84 Percent of Renters Intend on Buying a 
Home (National Mortgage Professional Magazine, May 21, 2012), archived at 
http://perma.cc/38WR-PHMS. 
  
982 The University of Chicago Law Review [83:945 
   
B. Methodology 
This Section describes the estimation strategy. Part III.B.1 
presents a more formal regression model and explains how it re-
lates to the individual choices present in the data set. Part 
III.B.2 describes how the estimation works and its relation to 
previous well-being analyses, clarifying why the assumptions in 
the formal model are important. 
1. The formal model. 
The happiness regression analysis assumes that an individ-
ual has a separable utility function (that is, each aspect of an 
individual’s life influences her utility independently from other 
aspects, and the effect of each aspect can be isolated). The utility 
that the individual maximizes is a function of several factors, in-
cluding work-related income, other income, and behaviors such 
as the choice to sell one’s home at fair market value. 
Formally, the individual faces the following maximization 
problem, in which she maximizes utility by choosing certain ac-
tions (ܽ) and by choosing whether to move from her home: 
݉ܽݔ݅݉݅ݖ݁		ݑ ൌ ൜ݑሺݕ ൅ ݅ െ ܥ௠௢௩௘, ܽሻ െ ܦ ∗ ܫሼܱݓ݊ሽ ൅ ݑሺܯ௜ሻ														݂݅	݉݋ݒ݁ݑሺݕ ൅ ݅, ܽሻ																																																																				݂݅	݊݋	݉݋ݒ݁  
where ݕ is the individual’s income level, ݅ is the individual’s 
nonlabor income, ܽ is a general vector of actions that the indi-
vidual can choose (such as consumption decisions), ܥ௠௢௩௘ is the 
cost of moving, and ܦ is the utility cost of giving up an owned 
home net of the payments that one receives when selling it. This 
cost is experienced only by individuals who move from homes 
they own, since ܫሼܱݓ݊ሽ	is equal to 1 if an individual moves from 
a home that she owns. Moreover, the model assumes that ݑሺܯ௜ሻ, 
which represents the benefits of moving given the reasons that 
were specified, is independent of whether one owns. That is, 
these benefits are constant across owners and renters; so, for 
example, if a person moves because of a better job opportunity, 
her utility level will be the same regardless of whether she owns 
or rents.189 Note that each individual made the choice of whether 
to own a home in the previous period. This means the choice to 
 
 189 This is a strong assumption, but one reason to make it is that the movers in the 
regression sample are restricted to include only moving individuals who expected to stay 
in their homes. Thus, the decision to own or rent was not conditioned on expectations 
that the utility from moving would be high enough to choose to move. 
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own the home from which one is considering moving is not part of 
the individual’s current-period utility-maximization problem.190 
If an individual chooses to move, the increase in utility due 
to moving minus the utility cost of selling one’s home and being 
paid only fair market value is greater than the value of staying. 
That is, 
ݑሺݕ ൅ ݅	 െ ܥ௠௢௩௘, ܽሻ െ ܦ ∗ ܫሼܱݓ݊ሽ 	൅ ݑሺܯ௜ሻ ൐ ݑሺݕ ൅ ݅, ܽሻ. 
In other words, if the data show individuals moving, this is be-
cause the utility associated with moving—which includes the 
cost of giving up one’s home and receiving only fair market value 
in return—exceeds the utility of staying. 
The parameter to be estimated (as described below) is the 
sum of money, ݏ, such that the moving individual is compen-
sated for having to give up the home she owned while being paid 
only the fair market value. That is, ݏ is the value that makes the 
following equation hold: 
ݑሺݕ ൅ ݅ െ ܥ௠௢௩௘ ൅ ݏ, ܽሻ െ ܦ ∗ ܫሼܱݓ݊ሽ ൅ ݑሺܯ௜ሻ ൌ ݑሺݕ ൅ ݅	 െ ܥ௠௢௩௘, ܽሻ ൅ ݑሺܯ௜ሻ. 
This equation simplifies to: 
ݑሺݕ ൅ ݅	 െ ܥ௠௢௩௘ ൅ ݏ, ܽሻ െ ܦ ∗ ܫሼܱݓ݊ሽ ൌ ݑሺݕ ൅ ݅	 െ ܥ௠௢௩௘, ܽሻ. 
This estimated value ݏ can then be interpreted as the make-
whole amount: the amount that leaves an individual indifferent 
between (1) moving from a home that she owned and being paid 
only fair market value, and (2) moving but not having to bear 
the subjective-valuation wedge.191 That is, it is the amount nec-
essary to compensate the owner for any additional loss of good-
will in the neighborhood and memories associated with her resi-
dence compared to the average renter, and for all the 
idiosyncratic investments she made in the property that were 
not fully reflected in its fair market value.192 This is equivalent to 
trying to find the amount of money that would make the utility 
levels of the individuals who sold their homes equal to the utility 
 
 190 A more complicated model would reflect the fact that if one chooses to move, one 
has to make a decision as to whether to own or rent the new residence—but for simplici-
ty, this model assumes that the choice is the same for owners and renters. Later regres-
sions do not make this assumption, as they control for current-period ownership status. 
 191 For a similar setup but with the death of a loved one represented by ܦ, see Oswald 
and Powdthavee, 37 J Legal Stud at S222–23 (cited in note 27). 
 192 See Part II.A.1. 
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levels of those who moved but did not have to sell a home to do so 
(that is, who rented rather than owned). 
To estimate ݏ, the empirical strategy follows the methodology 
used by Oswald and Powdthavee in their works using happiness 
regressions to estimate compensation. In their articles, the regres-
sions “trace out a form of indifference curve between income and 
any kind of life event.”193 This curve is then used to establish the 
amount that an individual would need to be paid to be just as well 
off in a state in which she was paid that amount and the event 
happened, as compared to the counterfactual state in which the 
event did not happen at all. Oswald and Powdthavee do this using 
the BHPS data set to estimate the cost of the death of a loved 
one194 and to estimate the cost of an event causing disability.195 
Specifically, Table 3 in this Comment reflects an adjusted re-
gression specification similar to that of Oswald and Powdthavee,196 
in which 
 
ܮ ௜ܵ,௧ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚଵܫ൛ܯ݋ݒ݁௜,௧ൟ ൅ ߚଶܫ൛ܯ݋ݒ݁௜,௧, ܱݓ݊௜,௧ିଵൟ ൅ ߛଵܫ൛ܯ݋ݒ݁௜,௧ିଵൟ
൅ ߛଶܫ൛ܯ݋ݒ݁௜,௧ିଵ, ܱݓ݊௜,௧ିଶൟ ൅ ߜଵܫ൛ܯ݋ݒ݁௜,௧ିଶൟ
൅ ߜଶܫ൛ܯ݋ݒ݁௜,௧ିଶ, ܱݓ݊௜,௧ିଷൟ ൅ ௜ܺ,௧ᇱ ߞ ൅ ߝ௜,௧. 
In this specification, ܮ ௜ܵ,௧ is the life-satisfaction value re-
ported by individual ݅ at time period ݐ; ߙ௜ is the individual’s av-
erage level of happiness in the data; ܫ൛ܯ݋ݒ݁௜,௧, ܱݓ݊௜,௧ିଵൟ takes a 
value of 1 if the individual moved in period ݐ and owned the res-
idence prior to that move; ܫ൛ܯ݋ݒ݁௜,௧ൟ takes a value of 1 if the in-
dividual moved in period ݐ, regardless of whether she owned the 
residence she moved from; ௜ܺ,௧ᇱ  is a vector of individual-level con-
trols, including personal and household characteristics that 
could affect life satisfaction and that might be correlated with 
the variable of interest (most notably, income); and ߝ௜,௧ is the er-
ror term in the regression.197 The coefficients of special interest 
 
 193 Oswald and Powdthavee, 37 J Legal Stud at S220 (cited in note 27). 
 194 Id at S217. 
 195 See generally Oswald and Powdthavee, 92 J Pub Econ 1061 (cited in note 77). 
Although a similar equation is not provided in the article on bereavement, Tables 3 and 
4 in that article reflect a similar regression specification. Oswald and Powdthavee, 37 J 
Legal Stud at S234–37 (cited in note 27). 
 196 Oswald and Powdthavee, 92 J Pub Econ at 1067 (cited in note 77).  
 197 Id at 1067–69. Specifically, this vector includes sex; age; age squared divided by 
100; log of real household income per capita; and dummy variables for relationship sta-
tus, employment status, student status, education level and achievement, homeowner-
ship status, number of children, and household size. 
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here are ߚଶ, ߛଶ, and ߜଶ, which capture the effect on an individu-
al’s happiness of moving from a home she owns in the first year, 
second year, and third year after the move, respectively, control-
ling for the general effects of moving on happiness in those 
years. Thus, the coefficients ߚଶ, ߛଶ, and ߜଶ are the cost in terms 
of life satisfaction of giving up a home one owned and of being 
paid only its fair market value. As in Oswald and Powdthavee’s 
calculation of compensation for the death of a family member, 
these coefficients of special interest can be used to estimate ݏ by 
using the coefficient on income to convert the effect of moving on 
happiness into monetary terms.198 
2. Discussion of the assumptions behind the model and 
their validity. 
Oswald and Powdthavee lay out the following identification 
assumptions (that is, the assumptions about the data that must 
hold for the inferences to be valid) that are necessary for such an 
approach in order to estimate ݏ. In this Comment, ݏ is the make-
whole amount that leaves the individual indifferent between 
(1) moving from a home that she owned and being paid only fair 
market value, and (2) moving but without bearing the subjective-
valuation wedge. But in Oswald and Powdthavee’s articles, ݏ is 
the compensation amount that leaves the individual indifferent 
between a death in the family with compensation and the family 
member living without the compensation (and similarly indiffer-
ent in the context of losing a limb) in terms of happiness lev-
els.199 The assumptions are: 
1. Individuals in a sample must be followed over a rea-
sonably long period, so that information on them is 
available before and after [the event.] 
2. The bad life event must be exogenous. 
3. There needs to be a control group of individuals unaf-
fected by the event. 
4. The sample should be reasonably representative of 
the adult population. 
 
 198 See Oswald and Powdthavee, 37 J Legal Stud at S231 (cited in note 27) (using 
the “coefficient on real household income” to “work out how much income would be re-
quired to offset the distress from an event such as bereavement”).  
 199 Id at S223; Oswald and Powdthavee, 92 J Pub Econ at 1062 (cited in note 77) 
(using the name ܿ∗ rather than ݏ to denote the same parameter of interest). 
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5. A set of control variables, including income, should be 
available in the data set, so that confounding influ-
ences can be differenced out.200 
The methodology and the data set used in this Comment 
meet most of these criteria. The sample is over an eighteen-year 
period, which is a greater time period than those used by most of 
the articles in this literature. Similarly, the sample includes a 
control group of individuals who did not move. As mentioned 
above, the creators of the data set took steps to ensure that it 
was representative of the adult British population,201 and the 
vast number of questions asked—including a 259-page ques-
tionnaire in one wave202—allows for the construction of a set of 
reasonable control variables. 
The more tenuous part of the approach has to do with the 
inapplicability of the second identification assumption regarding 
exogeneity in a well-being analysis of moving: because the indi-
vidual makes a choice to move away from a home that she owns, 
the move from an owned home is not exogenous. That is, when 
the sample of movers is not restricted to individuals who have 
been subject to eminent domain, one can reasonably expect 
those who move to be responding to life events—such as becom-
ing dissatisfied with their communities—that are generally un-
observed and that are highly correlated with happiness. This 
creates an endogeneity problem. That is, the choice to move is 
related to unobserved events or conditions that are highly relat-
ed to happiness levels, and thus the econometrician cannot dis-
entangle the effects on happiness due to moving from the effects 
on happiness due to those events that she does not observe. For 
this reason, a well-being analysis would ideally be performed us-
ing a data set that involved individuals who were subject to em-
inent domain. In such a data set, the fact that individuals were 
forced to move would mean that unobservable events motivating 
individuals to move would no longer be a problem.203 
 
 200 Oswald and Powdthavee, 37 J Legal Stud at S223 (cited in note 27). 
 201 See id at S224. 
 202 See Wave 6 Questionnaire (cited in note 178) (presenting one of the shorter 
questionnaires). 
 203 That is, although the population subject to eminent domain may be different 
from the population that is not (as discussed above, potentially due to race), by control-
ling for individual characteristics, the analysis would be consistent with Oswald and 
Powdthavee’s approach. It could also isolate the effects of experiencing eminent domain, 
because going through eminent domain (and receiving fair market value compensation) 
is itself more like a death in the family or a lost limb in that it is not chosen in response 
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While the event of moving from an owned home is not exog-
enous in the BHPS data set, the above regression specification 
aims to control for any influences on happiness that are corre-
lated with the decision to move from an owned home. The goal of 
doing this is to identify the particular effect of the process of re-
ceiving fair market value for one’s home when selling it. First, 
the regressions include controls for the different life events that 
can motivate a move by making use of the reasons provided for 
the move. By including these in the regressions, the relationship 
between those events and happiness is estimated and controlled 
for. Moreover, to the extent that a move is an action taken to 
improve one’s happiness level (recall that an individual moves 
only because she expects to be happier moving rather than stay-
ing), the regression equations also control for this general effect 
of moving. Finally, the regressions include a control for whether 
the individual upgraded to another owned home that was worth 
more in value, as this is another potential source of happiness. 
After these sources of variation in happiness are controlled for, 
what remains is the effect of being paid the fair market value for 
one’s home. Thus, even though this event is not exogenous, its 
effect can be estimated. Moreover, the timing supports an infer-
ence of causation, as the decision to move was made prior to the 
observed level of happiness.204 
The individuals who move but do not give up owned homes 
help to separately identify the effects of ownership because of 
the relationship between the move itself and the underlying ra-
tionale for the move on happiness levels. As long as the events 
underlying the rationales for moving are related to happiness in 
the same way for renting movers as they are for owning movers, 
the residual effect of giving up one’s home for fair market value 
can be estimated.  
For the identification strategy to work, it must be the case 
that there is a decent number of renters moving for the same 
reasons that owners move, such that the effect of that rationale 
on happiness can be separately estimated. As Table 1 shows, 
owners who move typically have reasons for moving that are 
 
to factors that the econometrician cannot observe, but instead it simply (and unfortu-
nately) happens to the individuals.  
 204 Of course, the move could be in response to a particular trend in the individual’s 
happiness level, and thus the change in happiness could precede the move. For example, 
a relationship with a family member could have disintegrated, and the move was away 
from a family member. This would have affected the individual’s happiness level before 
and after the move. Controlling for the reasons helps to address this. 
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similar to those of renters who move, and thus identification will 
not be a problem. 
TABLE 1.  REPORTED REASONS FOR MOVING AMONG MOVERS IN 
THE REGRESSION SAMPLE 
Reason Moving Renters Moving Owners 
Move In with Partner 43 66 
Split from Partner 44 159 
Move In with Family 8 9 
Move from Family 3 4 
Move In with Friend 4 0 
Closer to Family or Friend 41 60 
Move to College 20 7 
Left College 8 0 
Job Reason, Self 76 108 
Job Reason, Other 10 36 
Retirement 2 7 
Evicted or Repossessed 96 27 
Larger Accommodation 72 213 
Smaller Accommodation 62 111 
Own Accommodation 11 14 
Buy Accommodation 56 11 
Health Reasons 35 28 
No Stairs 25 24 
Another Type 5 3 
Other Accommodation Aspects 17 37 
Disliked Previous Accommodation 6 1 
Better Accommodation 35 23 
Privacy 3 4 
Wants Change 12 13 
Disliked Isolation 3 19 
Move to Rural Environment 3 10 
Move from Rural Environment 0 0 
Traffic 1 1 
Area Unsafe 10 3 
Noise 6 10 
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Area Unfriendly 20 8 
To a Specific Place 8 15 
Disliked Area 18 32 
Other 77 176 
Source: BHPS Data (cited in note 174); Understanding Society Data (cited in note 177). 
Not only are there owners and renters in each category, but the 
numbers are quite similar across the broader categories. While 
there are fewer owners who move due to eviction or foreclosure, 
there are no categories in which there are many owners who 
move but too few renters to be able to estimate the effects.  
Finally, all movers (both renters and owners) who intended 
to move are dropped from the data set. That is, the indicator for 
whether someone moved from a certain place is 1 only if she in-
dicated that she wished to stay in the previous residence in the 
period before moving. This is important because it helps support 
the assumption that the benefit of moving for a given specified 
reason is constant whether or not the individual owned the 
home. If the reason for a move was expected, the value of that 
reason might be reflected in the housing-tenure choice (renters 
might, on average, expect more of a reason to move). This re-
striction also has the benefit of making the moving population 
here more like takees, since takees also indicate a desire not to 
move or sell. After limiting the moving population to individuals 
who are designated as “primary renters” or “primary owners,” 
there are still 841 renting movers and 1306 owning movers. Table 
2 shows the distribution of these movers over the years in terms 
of the first year in which the effects of the moves are observed. 
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TABLE 2.  DISTRIBUTION OF MOVERS IN THE REGRESSION SAMPLE 
Source: BHPS Data (cited in note 174); Understanding Society Data (cited in note 177). 
Note that there are no observations for the year 2002, as the 
life-satisfaction question was not asked during that wave of the 
survey.205 
C. Results 
After controlling for the effect of moving, the regression re-
sults demonstrate a clear negative effect from moving from a 
home that one owns. The coefficients imply a multiplier that is 
about 22 percent for compensation that does not include moving 
expenses. Table 3 presents the results when the dependent vari-
able is the life-satisfaction variable. 
 
 205 BHPS Documentation - Subject Category Index (University of Essex Institute for 
Social and Economic Research), archived at http://perma.cc/3HUY-6VDD (showing that 
the variable wLFSATO, which is “Satisfaction with: life overall,” is not available in wave 
K of the survey). 
Year after Move 
Total  
Observations 
Renters Who 
Moved 
Owners Who 
Moved 
1997 6,603 47 44 
1998 6,622 44 65 
1999 7,962 44 74 
2000 7,641 51 77 
2001 11,106 82 105 
2003 11,825 66 112 
2004 11,497 73 136 
2005 10,992 59 123 
2006 11,013 62 80 
2007 10,916 64 124 
2008 10,668 56 118 
2009 10,190 62 70 
2010 6,562 48 77 
2011 6,245 31 34 
2012 5,770 20 35 
2013 5,573 32 32 
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TABLE 3.  IMPACT OF MOVING ON LIFE-SATISFACTION VALUES 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Moved Two Years Ago 0.0419 -0.0269 -0.0267 0.0203 
 (0.0545) (0.0450) (0.0450) (0.0580) 
Moved One Year Ago 0.176*** 0.00268 0.00289 0.175** 
 (0.0562) (0.0473) (0.0473) (0.0589) 
Moved in Previous Year 0.253*** 0.0795* 0.0797* 0.198*** 
 (0.0584) (0.0483) (0.0483) (0.0626) 
Owned and Moved Two  0.0634 0.0117 -0.165 0.104 
Years Ago (0.0642) (0.0538) (0.254) (0.679) 
Owned and Moved One  -0.0206 0.00847 -0.168 -0.0245 
Year Ago (0.0635) (0.0543) (0.254) (0.0667) 
Owned and Moved in  -0.136** -0.0958* -0.0996* -0.0848 
Previous Year (0.0661) (0.0550) (0.0563) (0.0705) 
Household Income 2.02e-06*** 2.43e-07 2.43e-07 2.90e-06*** 
 (1.46e-07) (1.69e-07) (1.69e-07) (2.16e-07) 
Household Size -0.0229*** -0.0283*** -0.0283*** -0.0339*** 
 (0.00428) (0.00616) (0.00616) (0.00486) 
Homeowner 0.177*** -0.0602* -0.0604* 0.166*** 
 (0.0206) (0.0320) (0.0320) (0.0219) 
Primary Owner -0.0536*** -0.0249 -0.0248 -0.0681*** 
 (0.0134) (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0142) 
Primary Renter -0.124*** -0.0916*** -0.0916*** -0.134*** 
 (0.0219) (0.0279) (0.0279) (0.0234) 
Longtime Homeowner   0.176  
   (0.248)  
House Value   0.00417  
   (0.0508)  
Sex 0.0170** 0.657 0.657 0.0251*** 
 (0.00727) (0.458) (0.458) (0.00769) 
Age -0.0356*** 0.0142*** 0.0142*** -0.0306*** 
 (0.00158) (0.00379) (0.00379) (0.00165) 
Unemployed -0.360*** -0.121*** -0.121*** -0.354*** 
 (0.0114) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0123) 
University Graduate -0.0349*** 0.0573 0.0573 -0.0832*** 
 (0.00753) (0.0534) (0.0535) (0.00810) 
Current Student 0.536** 0.800** 0.800** 0.376 
 (0.255) (0.378) (0.378) (0.259) 
Retired 0.127*** 0.0972*** 0.0971*** -0.156*** 
 (0.0164) (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0179) 
Number of Children -0.0130** 0.00337 0.00336 -0.0119* 
 (0.00553) (0.00712) (0.00712) (0.00608) 
Constant 5.837*** 3.770*** 3.770*** 5.575*** 
 (0.0528) (0.724) (0.724) (0.0547) 
Observations 131,821 131,821 131,821 107,682 
R-Squared 0.060 0.013 0.013 0.065 
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Individual Fixed Effects NO YES YES NO 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Region Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Move Reason Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Instrumental Variable for 
Income NO NO NO YES 
Number of pid  21,078 21,078  
Note: Robust standard errors are indicated in parentheses. 
*** = p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.1 
Model 1 is a simple regression that leaves out individual 
fixed effects—that is, the individual’s identity is not used in the 
regression. Although the individual’s survey responses from 
previous years were used to determine whether she moved and 
for what reasons, the regression treats the happiness results 
from an individual in one year and the next as if they were from 
separate people. Models 2 and 3 both include fixed effects—that 
is, the information on an individual’s happiness levels in previ-
ous and later years is used in the regressions. Model 3 is differ-
ent from Model 2 in that the former includes indicators for 
whether the individual moved from a house she had lived in for 
a long time (more than fifteen years), and it also tests for the ef-
fect of controlling for moves from especially expensive homes. 
One important caveat about the Long Housing Tenure variable 
is that it includes only a subset of moves from houses in which 
there was a long housing tenure, as the date at which ownership 
was initiated was often not available in the data set.206 As such, 
the dummy variable for this variable is 1 when it is known that 
the owner lived there for more than fifteen years; when the 
dummy variable is 0, however, it is also possible that the owner 
lived there for more than fifteen years, and there may simply be 
insufficient data to determine the length of the tenure. Model 4 
instruments for household income using income from the past 
period and whether the interviewer was able to verify the survey 
respondent’s claimed income using a pay slip; income may be 
endogenous to life satisfaction because, for example, someone 
may be more able to make money when her psychological well-
being is greater.207 
 
 206 See notes 174, 177 (presenting data that omit relevant information about the 
date of initial ownership). 
 207 For an example of this step being taken in a similar context, see Oswald and 
Powdthavee, 37 J Legal Stud at S231, S238 (cited in note 27) (proposing “income meas-
ured at t − 1” and “whether or not the interviewer sees the paycheck,” among other po-
tential instruments). 
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A fixed-effects model is the equivalent of including a dummy 
variable for each individual person—that is, the regression esti-
mates an average level of happiness for each person in the data 
set.208 This helps to make the coefficients in front of the changing 
regressor variables more precise to the extent that one would ex-
pect those regressor variables to interact with unobserved indi-
vidual characteristics that do not change over time (as one might 
expect when the outcome variable is happiness).209 For this rea-
son, the estimates in Models 2 and 3 are better than those in 
Model 1, as they make better use of the information in the data set. 
For Models 2 and 3, the coefficients on the control variables 
are generally in the proper direction that the theory would predict 
in cases in which they are significant. For example, unemployment 
is negatively correlated with higher individual happiness levels, 
and when income is significant, it is positively correlated with life-
satisfaction levels. After controlling for the general effect of mov-
ing, these results imply that moving from a home that one owns 
has a negative impact on happiness in the year after the move. 
While the Long Housing Tenure variable that was included 
in Model 3 is not statistically significant, this is perhaps due to 
too few instances of long housing tenure (as discussed above) or 
simply to a small sample, as homeownership has become more 
popular in recent years in Britain210 and, thus, people are less 
likely to move from homes that they have been in for a while.211 
Similarly, the Top Quintile Home Value variable captures 
whether the value of the home is in the top 20 percent of moving 
individuals who wanted to stay in their homes. These variables 
were included to check whether some owners are more hurt by 
being paid only fair market compensation and to make sure that 
the coefficients on the variables of interest are not being driven 
by outliers. Neither of these points in the direction that one 
would expect, but that may be because the assumptions about 
 
 208 See Joshua D. Angrist and Jörn-Steffen Pischke, Mostly Harmless Econometrics: 
An Empiricist’s Companion 223 (Princeton 2009). 
 209 For example, some individuals may be more optimistic about their futures be-
cause they know something about themselves that the econometrician does not—such as 
particular skills that are not measured—that would make their happiness levels higher. 
Fixed effects can control for these general, unchanging characteristics.  
 210 Indeed, from 1971 to 2011, rates of homeownership in Britain increased from 50 
to 64 percent. A Century of Home Ownership and Renting in England and Wales (Office 
for National Statistics, Apr 19, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/5KJG-4EQH. 
 211 See René Böheim and Mark P. Taylor, Tied Down or Room to Move? Investigat-
ing the Relationships between Housing Tenure, Employment Status and Residential Mo-
bility in Britain, 49 Scottish J Polit Econ 369, 383 (2002). 
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similar reasons for moving break down in the case of longtime 
homeowners compared to renters, and the longtime homeowners 
may be moving to especially good opportunities given that they 
chose to leave houses in which they had spent so much time.212 
D. Legal Implications 
The results derived from the BHPS data set provide support 
for states adopting multipliers and for courts analyzing eminent 
domain issues to consider a multiplier as consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s guidance on just compensation. 
1. Justifying a fair market value multiplier. 
These results can be used to support an appropriate multi-
plier for the housing value that reflects the effect of an eminent 
domain action on happiness. The more-conservative results 
found in Model 2 imply that moving leads to, on average, a 
0.0958 decrease in a homeowner’s well-being in the year after 
the move relative to a renter’s well-being (on a scale from 1 to 7, 
where the average life-satisfaction level is 5.21). Because Model 
4 implies that, on average, the payment of an additional pound 
increases happiness by 0.00000290 life-satisfaction points,213 an 
individual would need to be compensated by £33,034 to be truly 
“made whole.” After throwing out outliers at the bottom 5 per-
cent and top 5 percent, the average value for owned housing in 
the BHPS data set (reported by respondents as the price for 
which they would expect to sell their home) is around £150,000. 
Thus, moving from a home one owns relative to moving from a 
home one rents implies an average decrease in happiness cost-
ing 22 percent of the estimated fair market value of the average 
individual’s property in monetary terms. 
 
 212 Two other robustness checks that are not reflected in the above table were per-
formed. The above table uses measurements of move effects for only three years, because 
when a fourth move variable was added—which would have shown the effects on happiness 
for four years from the date of the move—there was not a significant coefficient on that 
term. Because Stata drops observations when there are missing values, adding that extra 
year meant that the data set was smaller. Thus, this Comment reports the estimates for 
only three years’ worth of effects on happiness with the appropriate lags. A lag of three 
years is consistent with what Oswald and Powdthavee use in measuring the effects of disa-
bility. Oswald and Powdthavee, 92 J Pub Econ at 1068 (cited in note 77). In addition, the 
time of year at which the person took the survey did not change the estimates on the varia-
bles of interest, so indicators for this variable have been left out of the regression.  
 213 This is the most conservative estimate, and it is also likely the most reliable one 
because it begins to address the endogeneity problems associated with income. 
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What are the implications of an accurate multiplier for the 
current fair market value that is provided in the eminent do-
main context? Again, while the above results must be caveated 
with the caution that strict assumptions have been made to al-
low identification, these results imply that the average person 
subject to eminent domain is undercompensated by 22 percent of 
the value of her property. 
These results provide support for states that have adopted 
nonzero multipliers. The estimate using the income coefficient in 
the data implies that the states discussed in Part I.B with 25 
percent multipliers—Connecticut and Michigan, as well as 
Missouri (for “nonheritage homes”)—are in the right range given 
the more conservative estimate, especially considering that the 
22 percent multiplier does not yet include moving costs,214 which 
can be reasonably estimated as exceeding an additional 3 per-
cent.215 While Indiana, Missouri (for “heritage homes”), and 
Rhode Island employ multipliers that exceed the 22 percent es-
timate, this estimate is a lower bound. Thus, it is possible that 
higher multipliers offer compensation that is closer to the actual 
average subjective valuation. This analysis provides support for 
other states that have recognized the undercompensatory nature 
of the fair market value standard by compensating relocation ex-
penses, but that as of yet have been unwilling to use a multiplier. 
In addition, this analysis provides an additional alternative to 
the fair market value standard for courts that wish to follow the 
Supreme Court’s requirements that an individual be “made 
whole.”216 The Supreme Court endorsed a fair market value stand-
ard because of its workability, on the assumption that no other 
workable standards existed.217 However, a 22 percent multiplier 
based on this well-being analysis provides an estimate for the 
 
 214 See Part I.B. 
 215 An interstate household move alone has been estimated to cost $9,000, with clos-
ing costs on a new-home purchase estimated to be as high as “3 [percent] of the purchase 
price” and survey evidence implying an average total transaction cost of 12 percent. John 
M. Quigley, Transactions Costs and Housing Markets, in Tony O’Sullivan and Kenneth 
Gibb, eds, Housing Economics and Public Policy 56, 59–60 (Blackwell Science 2003). 
This is in addition to the possibility that minorities pay extra search costs in this pro-
cess—one scholar has estimated that minorities may face a “discrimination tax” of ap-
proximately $3,000. Camille Zubrinsky Charles, The Dynamics of Racial Residential 
Segregation, in J. Rosie Tighe and Elizabeth J. Mueller, eds, The Affordable Housing 
Reader 499, 519 (Routledge 2013), citing John Yinger, Closed Doors, Opportunities Lost: 
The Continuing Costs of Housing Discrimination 95–103 (Russell Sage 1995). 
 216 Olson, 292 US at 255. See also Part III.A–B.  
 217 See notes 39–41 and accompanying text. 
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amount that needs to be paid to an individual—an amount that 
can be “readily estimated”218 and that “has an external validity 
which makes it a fair measure of public obligation to compen-
sate.”219 For these reasons, it meets the workability criteria of 
fair market value by estimating an owner’s subjective value of 
her property. However, it has the extra benefit of, on average, 
getting the subjective valuation correct in terms of meeting the 
Supreme Court’s requirement of making the individual whole, 
as opposed to the fair market value standard, which is guaran-
teed to undercompensate when legally applied.220 Thus, the con-
servative approach taken in calculating this multiplier provides 
a basis for courts to begin compensating individuals with the 
fair market value plus an additional 22 percent of that value to 
satisfy the Fifth Amendment. 
2. Addressing objections. 
All multipliers, even ones that are rigorously pegged to an 
average valuation, raise the concern of overcompensation, and 
there are many authors who have rejected multipliers in part 
due to such concerns.221 While the fair market value guarantees 
that all individuals are undercompensated, a well-being-analysis 
approach allows individuals with below-average subjective valu-
ations to be overcompensated while still allowing individuals 
with above-average subjective valuations to be undercompen-
sated (just less so than the fair market value standard would 
have allowed).222 Moreover, this raises the concern that individ-
uals with below-average valuations will actively lobby for their 
 
 218 Boom Co v Patterson, 98 US (8 Otto) 403, 408 (1878). 
 219 Kimball Laundry, 338 US at 5. 
 220 See Parts I.A, II.A.1. 
 221 See, for example, Somin, The Grasping Hand at 207 (cited in note 56) (noting 
that under a supra–fair market value approach, owners “might actually be overcompen-
sated”); Fennell, 2004 Mich St L Rev at 993–94 (cited in note 38) (pointing out perverse 
incentives when percentage bonuses exceed subjective valuations).  
 222 While the fact that some individuals are still undercompensated is also a criti-
cism of the multiplier approach, these individuals are undercompensated less than they 
would be under the fair market value standard, and thus a multiplier based on a well-
being-analysis approach is an improvement in this respect. Absent a better alternative 
that can meet the Court’s call for a workable estimate, this improvement supports adopt-
ing a multiplier based on a well-being-analysis approach. 
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properties to be taken using eminent domain, as they will bene-
fit from the overestimation that occurs with a multiplier.223 
Neither of these criticisms is fatal to the use of a multiplier 
derived from a well-being analysis. First, the fact that there is 
some overcompensation is not necessarily worse than the status 
quo, in which the legal standard leads ex ante to undercompen-
sation. A true commitment to “making the individual whole” 
requires being willing to occasionally overcompensate in order to 
come closer to adequate compensation and, as demonstrated in 
Part II.A.2, overcompensation can also encourage rent-seeking. 
Assuming that individuals are symmetrically distributed around 
the average subjective value for a given good with the same fair 
market value, the expected error (that is to say, the deviation 
from making the individual whole, either through over- or under-
compensation) is minimized by using the average value rather 
than the fair market value given the choice between the two, 
and the disparity between these standards increases the more 
that individuals are clumped closer together.224 Thus, while 
there are deviations from the estimate of the economic value, a 
well-estimated multiplier comes closer to getting individuals to 
the make-whole amount required by the courts under certain 
 
 223 See Somin, The Grasping Hand at 207–09 (cited in note 56), citing Hawaii Hous-
ing Authority v Midkiff, 467 US 229, 233 (1984) (suggesting that this problem has oc-
curred even with the fair market value standard). 
 224 This can also be shown mathematically. Assume that there are individuals with 
four subjective valuations of properties with the same fair market values. Those subjec-
tive valuations are denoted by a, b, c, and d, and an individual with a valuation of i will 
be denoted as Person i. Without loss of generality, let a ≤ b ≤ c ≤ d. The multiplier, if cor-
rectly estimated, will lead to a payment to each individual of (a + b + c + d) / 4, since that 
is the average subjective value and the properties have the same fair market values. 
This means that the error associated with individual a using the multiplier is 
(a + b + c + d) / 4 − a: since Person a has a lower-than-average subjective valuation, she 
is overpaid to the extent that the average subjective valuation is greater than her own. 
Similarly, the error associated with Person b is (a + b + c + d) / 4 − b. Both Person c and 
Person d are underpaid under the multiplier approach, and thus the errors associated 
with their payments will be the extent to which their subjective valuations exceed the 
payments they receive, which is c − (a + b + c + d) / 4 and d − (a + b + c + d) / 4, respec-
tively. The sum of all of these individual errors is c + d − a − b, which is the total error 
associated with the multiplier. Although the error associated with the fair market value 
standard cannot be estimated without knowledge of the fair market value, a lower bound 
for it can be calculated. The fair market value has to be less than or equal to a—otherwise 
Person a would have sold. This means that the lower bound on the error associated with 
the fair market value is (b − a) + (c − a) + (d − a) + (a − a) = b + c + d − 3a. Note that we can 
rewrite the error associated with the multiplier as c + d − a − b = b + c + d − a − 2b in order 
to compare the lower bound of the fair market value standard with the multiplier. Because 
2a ≤ 2b, the multiplier must always do at least as well as the fair market value standard 
and will do better as long as there is enough variation in the subjective values. 
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distributions. Of course, with a rich data set, a well-being analy-
sis has the potential to verify these distributions through quin-
tile regressions, and thus its methodology can also be used to de-
termine precisely how much a proposed multiplier reduces error. 
Second, courts have two tools to protect against potential 
abuses in response to overcompensation, and they can use these 
doctrines to downwardly adjust the estimates in response to cas-
es in which individuals lobby for their properties to be taken. 
The first is the courts’ ability to adjust practical estimates when 
doing so is required to avoid “manifest injustice.”225 When the 
Fifth Amendment standard of fair market value “would result in 
manifest injustice to owner or public, courts have fashioned and 
applied other standards.”226 Because these standards can be in-
voked to protect the public,227 courts could police such lobbying 
on the ground that it is part of a “manifest injustice” against tax-
payers, and they could revert to the fair market value standard in 
the case of individuals’ abuse of the higher standard. In addition, 
there is currently a significant body of case law requiring that the 
government engage in good faith bargaining,228 and this obligation 
could be imposed on property owners if a risk of overcompensa-
tion were introduced. For example, because lobbying for eminent 
domain action makes rejections of fair market value offers no 
longer credible (the individual is actively seeking a buyer), this 
adapted requirement could be used to deny individuals supra–fair 
market value compensation through the eminent domain process. 
Finally, a richer data set for a well-being analysis and its more 
complex estimates would help mitigate the overcompensation 
 
 225 United States v Commodities Trading Corp, 339 US 121, 123 (1950). 
 226 Id.  
 227 Although they preceded the term “manifest injustice,” Olson as well as United 
States v Miller, 317 US 369 (1943), are later cited as examples in which courts prevented 
“manifest injustice” by adjusting fair market value at the time of the takings in order to 
protect the purchaser. See notes 30, 44, and accompanying text. For an example of a 
court actually invoking this standard to protect the purchaser, see Toledo, Peoria & 
Western Railway v Surface Transportation Board, 462 F3d 734, 747 (7th Cir 2006) (ac-
cepting an averaged price for compensation, because “the inflated prices of steel on the 
date of final sale and on the date of appropriation meant that market value on those 
dates . . . did not represent the fair market value of [Toledo, Peoria & Western Railway’s] 
assets and would result in ‘manifest injustice’ to the purchaser”). 
 228 See, for example, Garnett, 105 Mich L Rev at 129 & n 170 (cited in note 111); 
Krupicka v Village of Dorchester, 804 NW2d 37, 49 (Neb App 2011) (upholding the trial 
court’s finding that the condemnor had met the Nebraska statute’s good faith negotiation 
requirement); Valleybrook Developers, Inc v Gulf Power Co, 272 S2d 167, 169 (Fla App 
1973) (reversing the district court’s finding that there was insufficient evidence of good 
faith estimation in a taking). 
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concern. Such a data set would provide an opportunity to tailor 
the estimate to individual characteristics by interacting individu-
al characteristics with the variable indicating that the individual 
was subject to an eminent domain action. For example, the analy-
sis could provide a separate multiplier for individuals who have 
lived in homes for five years in comparison to ten years, and it 
could provide a separate multiplier for individuals with small 
families in comparison to large ones. This requires answering dif-
ficult questions about the role of statistical analyses in treating 
individuals differently; however, as these estimates become more 
accurate, it will become more difficult for individuals to get an ad-
justed compensation that is actually above the economic value 
compensation. In addition, these estimates allow governments to 
target those who have lower subjective valuations, helping to al-
leviate allocative-efficiency concerns. 
CONCLUSION 
This Comment provides an argument for applying a well-
being-analysis approach to eminent domain compensation, dis-
cussing the inefficiencies that result from compensating indi-
viduals with only the fair market value of their properties and 
arguing that a well-being-analysis approach provides a way out 
of the practical compromises made in eminent domain juris-
prudence. Although happiness regressions do not demonstrate 
the exact valuation that an individual has of her property, using 
a multiplier that reflects the average subjective premium gener-
ated by a happiness regression is consistent with value-of-life 
evidence, which uses information about others to estimate an 
average multiplier that ensures more-accurate damages. 
This Comment demonstrates that the BHPS data set, along 
with certain assumptions about why individuals move, implies that 
a wedge exists between the subjective valuation of an owned prop-
erty and its fair market value. Not only does this wedge exist but it 
measures somewhere around or above 22 percent of fair market 
value. Given such a potentially large effect, this Comment aims to 
inspire future survey work with respect to individuals who are re-
quired to move. Such survey data would measure changes in hap-
piness when the move—since it is due to eminent domain—is exog-
enous. For this reason, regression analyses based on such moves 
will provide even more-accurate estimates for the average under-
compensation that occurs when individuals are paid only the fair 
market value of their properties in the context of eminent domain. 
